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I. In t r o d u c t io n
The Great Depression prompted the modem era of broad, intensive federal regulation 
of corporate capital raising. The crown jewel and major innovation of this regulatory 
regime was mandatory disclosure—the requirement that issuers of securities disclose 
specific information to the public, both upon issuance and on an ongoing basis post­
issuance. This disclosure requirement was intended to empower investors to make their 
own decisions, by ensuring that the public received a baseline of relevant (and uniformly 
presented) information from issuing companies.1 U.S. corporate financing has been 
profoundly shaped by this regulatory design ever since.
Of course, mandatory disclosure is not costless. The direct transaction costs to issuers, 
their underwriters, and the government are substantial, to say nothing of the indirect costs.2 
Given the stakes involved, the obvious and crucial question is whether mandatory 
disclosure actually works. Does it even achieve the goals ascribed to it, and if so, do these 
benefits outweigh the associated costs? After more than eight decades of federal securities 
regulation, the answers to these questions remain surprisingly elusive. It turns out that 
testing the securities laws’ effectiveness is extraordinarily difficult, and the limited 
evidence obtained to date is decidedly mixed.
This Article asserts that we may finally gain some purchase on this question—if only 
we look in the right place. Whether implicitly or explicitly, discussions of the merits of 
securities regulation deal almost exclusively with equity instruments, particularly common 
stock, rather than with debt. The privileging of equity over debt is ubiquitous in the 
literature.3 Yet the corporate debt markets swamp the equity markets in size.4 Ignoring the 
debt markets when assessing the securities laws is a surprising omission that this Article 
seeks to remedy.
Indeed, recent sweeping changes in the debt markets have created near-perfect 
conditions for testing mandatory disclosure’s effectiveness. Long viewed as contrasting
1. Mandatory disclosure thus stands in stark contrast to government agencies’ substantive review of 
investment opportunities, which until then had been the states’ predominant form of securities regulation. See 
Frank FI. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection o f Investors, 70 Va . L. Rev . 
669, 669-70 (1984) (contrasting the federal disclosure regime with the substantive regulation of investments).
2. See infra Part II.B (discussing the costs and benefits of mandatory disclosure).
3. In discussions of the securities laws, this predilection for equity over debt is explained by the fact that 
equity securities are riskier overall, and retail direct investors still hold a meaningful share of the stock market. 
See infra note 88 (dealing with the near-complete absence of direct retail investors from the corporate debt 
markets).
4. In 2006 alone, the total amount of corporate debt issuances exceeded $1 trillion, compared to only $152 
billion in equity issuances. Hendrik Bessembinder & William Maxwell, Markets: Transparency and the 
Corporate Bond Market, 22 J. Econ. Persp. 217,219 (2008).
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forms of debt, the markets for large corporate loans (referred to as syndicated loans) and 
corporate bonds are rapidly converging into a single asset class.5 Yet bonds are treated as 
securities under the federal securities laws, while loans are not. The existence of two 
functionally equivalent markets, one regulated and the other unregulated, amounts to a 
natural experiment testing the federal securities laws’ effects on the largest source of 
corporate financing, the corporate debt markets. Though the convergence is as yet 
incomplete, it is enough to make the longstanding regulatory distinction between the two 
untenable under existing doctrine.
That bonds and loans are now virtually interchangeable is nothing short of remarkable. 
In the canons of corporate finance, the two instruments have historically been at opposite 
ends of the debt spectrum.6 Corporate bonds were typically understood as long-term, 
passive investments in blue-chip corporations. Bank loans, on the other hand, were short­
term extensions of credit most suited to small, opaque companies requiring intensive 
monitoring by the creditor. Bonds were thus appropriate for dispersed, unsophisticated 
retail investors, and were highly liquid instruments (that is, readily tradable). By contrast, 
loans were funded nearly exclusively by banks, which specialized in credit analysis, had 
the ability and incentives to monitor their borrowers closely, and were themselves tightly 
regulated entities. Because of the steep information costs associated with these loans, they 
were typically held to maturity by the bank that funded them, and thus plainly illiquid. 
These fundamental differences between bonds and loans in the nature and type of their 
creditors, their liquidity, and the information required by creditors justified the treatment 
of bonds as securities and loans as non-securities.
Yet dramatic changes to the corporate loan market have converted it into something 
closely akin to the bond market.7 Changes in both supply and demand have radically 
altered the fundamental nature of corporate loans, transforming them into instruments that 
can be traded by passive investors. Large corporate loans are no longer funded and held to 
maturity by a single bank, but instead are syndicated to large groups of creditors and 
subsequently traded to reach still other creditors. More surprising still, banks represent only 
a small minority of such creditors. The outcome of this rapid and dramatic metamorphosis 
of the loan market is a new capital market that is both deep and highly liquid. The 
convergence of the bond and loan markets is particularly striking at the riskiest end of the 
spectrum in each. High-yield (or “junk”) bonds and leveraged loans refer to the bonds and 
syndicated loans, respectively, of companies with high ratios of debt to equity in their 
capital structure. Leveraged loans and high-yield bonds currently feature strikingly similar 
pricing, non-price terms, participants, and liquidity.
Unless and until the loan and bond markets become perfectly interchangeable (save 
for their regulation), the conclusions drawn from this natural experiment will necessarily 
be tentative. Yet, based solely on the convergence exhibited thus far, we may already derive 
a crucial result: the very existence of a liquid corporate loan market suggests that the
5. See infra Part IV (discussing the convergence of loans and bonds).
6. See infra Part III (discussing the opposing paradigms of loans and bonds).
7. See infra Part IV (discussing the convergence of loans and bonds).
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securities laws8 are not doing the work for which they were intended. Consider the two 
bedrock goals of mandatory disclosure under the federal securities laws: (1) protecting 
unsophisticated investors,9 and (2) remedying the underproduction of material investment 
information.10 The first goal is simply inapplicable in today’s debt markets, because both 
the corporate loan and corporate bond markets are, for all intents and purposes, purely 
institutional.11 Retail investors have always been absent from the corporate loan market, 
and recently have all but disappeared from the corporate bond market.12 Concerns about 
protecting individuals who cannot absorb losses are thus allayed in these markets.
The second goal requires some elaboration. The currently dominant theory supporting 
mandatory disclosure holds that, left to their own devices, companies lack incentives to 
provide investors with sufficient information, and investors lack incentives to pay for it, 
due to now familiar free-riding and collective action problems. Armed with too little 
reliable information, rational investors in an unregulated market will invest less than is 
efficient—a bad outcome for both investors and issuers. Requiring issuers to disclose 
material information to the public could thus increase the volume of investment in a market 
to something closer to its optimal level. In this view, mandatory disclosure is not a burden 
on investment (as issuers frequently lament), but rather a necessary condition to robust 
investment.
Unfortunately, the convergence of the loan and bond markets to date strongly suggests 
that this second aim of securities regulation is unrealized in the corporate debt markets: 
mandatory disclosure cannot be a necessary condition to developing a deep and liquid 
market, simply because the unregulated leveraged loan market, in which disclosure to
8. Throughout this Article, references to “securities regulation” or “securities laws” refer solely to the 
mandatory disclosure rules imposed on securities’ issuers (including for these purposes anti fraud liability), rather 
than to other areas of securities regulation, i.e., the regulation offender offers, shareholder voting, broker-dealers, 
and mutual funds, market transparency for trades, and, more recently, the regulation of corporate governance and 
executive compensation under Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank.
9. See H.R. Rep . No . 73-1383, at 5 (1934) (“[I]t becomes a condition of the very stability o f . . . society 
that its rules of law . . . protect [the] ordinary citizen’s dependent position.”); H.R. Rep . No . 73-85, at 2 (1933) 
(stating that “[t]he purpose of [the Securities Act of 1933] . . .  is to protect the public with the least possible 
interference to honest business.”); see generally JOEL SELIGMAN, The TRANSFORMATION OF Wall Street: A 
History of the Securities and Exchange Commission and Modern Corporate Finance (3d ed. 2003) 
(summarizing the views of proponents and legislators at the time the Securities Acts were enacted).
10. As a practical matter, the securities laws do not always result in issuers producing more, or mere 
frequent, information. They often restrict, or at a minimum delay, the information flow from companies to the 
market, most notably in the pre-IPO period. See, e.g., Nemit Shroff et al., Voluntary Disclosure and Information 
Asymmetry: Evidence from  the 2005 Securities Offering Reform, 51 J. ACCT. Res. 1299, 1299 (2013) (finding 
that information released to the market actually increased following relaxation of the SEC’s gun-jumping rules in 
2005). Given that mandatory disclosure may in fact limit information flow to the market, critiques o f mandated 
disclosure that rest on the problem of information overload to consumers might be misplaced. See, e.g., Omri 
Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure o f  Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. Pa . L. Rev . 647, 651 (2011) 
(characterizing mandatory disclosure to consumers as being based on the false premise that “more information is 
better than less’ ); Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks o f  the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More 
Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 Baylor L. Rev . 139, 160-63 (2006) (describing how 
securities regulation exacerbates information overload).
11. See infra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing the decrease in the proportion of direct retail 
investors).
12. Id.
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investors is limited, non-uniform, and purely voluntary, is now significantly larger than the 
regulated high-yield bond market.13 Purely through private ordering, the loan market 
appears to be providing sufficient information for investors to treat syndicated loans as they 
do bonds—that is, as largely passive investments that do not require intensive monitoring 
on their part. In summation, this implies that the securities laws are not achieving their 
principal goal in the markets for corporate debt.
Admittedly, this sweeping conclusion is unlikely to be well received in a world still 
scarred by the recent financial crisis. Yet, its normative implications are comparatively 
mild. Despite the near equivalence of the two markets, issuers have not migrated wholesale 
from the regulated high-yield bond market to the unregulated syndicated loan market; for 
the time being, the two markets exist side-by-side. Thus, even if securities regulation is 
unnecessary for robust investment in the corporate debt markets, it is also unlikely to truly 
impede investment—the institutional structures to support mandated disclosure are already 
in place, and investors such as mutual funds are still required to invest some portion of 
their assets in registered securities. The securities laws applicable to corporate debt may 
not be effective, yet nor do they appear terribly harmful. The latter point may explain why 
the regulatory dichotomy between the corporate loan and bond markets persists to this day, 
despite its now glaring lack of grounding: securities regulators may be tacitly (and 
cynically) acknowledging that, whether they treat leveraged loans as securities or not, the 
decision is unlikely to matter.
However, this Article’s skepticism about securities regulation in the debt markets 
merits a word of caution. The fact that mandatory disclosure is proving superfluous in the 
corporate debt markets certainly does not mean that the debt markets raise no regulatory 
concerns. Debt-fueled investment bubbles are particularly worrisome: when the bubble 
bursts and corporate credit suddenly dries up, as it did most dramatically during the Great 
Depression and most recently from 2007-2009, the ripple effects are felt throughout the 
economy, eventually harming “Main Street” workers and consumers. Far from advocating 
a hands-off approach to the debt markets, this Article merely suggests that mandatory 
disclosure is not (or is no longer) remedying the information failures for which it was 
designed and has little or no bearing on regulators’ most pressing concern: systemic risk.14 
In fact, while leveraged loan investors suffered steep losses in the recent financial crisis, 
high-yield bond investors’ losses were steeper, in spite of the securities laws’ protections.15
13. In 2012, leveraged loan market issuances reached $664 billion, compared to $327 billion in high-yield 
bond issuances. Ioana Barza, Press Release, 2012 U.S. High Yield Capital Markets Reach All-Time S991B 
Record, Thomson Reuters LPC (Apr. 19, 2014, 8:50 PM), https://www.loanpricing.com/2013/01/2012-u-s-high- 
yield-capital-markets-reach-all-time-991 b-record/.
14. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 Geo . L.J. 193, 204 (2008) (defining systemic risk as “the 
risk that (i) an economic shock . . . triggers (through a panic or otherwise) either (X) the failure of a chain of 
markets or institutions or (Y) a chain of significant losses to financial institutions, (ii) resulting in increases in the 
cost of capital or decreases in its availability . . .”); see also Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, 
"Publicness" in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 Geo. L.J. 337, 337 (2013) 
(recognizing “the public’s interest in a safe and stable financial system” as a key driver of securities regulation).
15. At the peak of U.S. corporate debt defaults in the fourth quarter of 2009, the leveraged loan default rate 
reached approximately 12%, compared to approximately 16% in the high-yield bond market. Alicia Sansone et 
al., Investing in Loans Through the Cycles, Loan Syndications & Trading Ass’n , 4 (2013), available at 
http ://www.lsta.org/WorkArea/showcontent.aspx?id=l 6749.
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When the debt markets crash again—which they inevitably will—the presence or absence 
of mandatory disclosure will not be the difference-maker.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II briefly surveys the largely inconclusive 
empirical studies on the effectiveness of mandatory disclosure. Parts III through V offer a 
different approach to assessing securities regulation in the debt markets. Specifically, Part 
III describes the traditional opposing paradigms of corporate bonds and corporate loans 
that long justified their status under the federal securities laws as securities and non­
securities, respectively. Part IV identifies recent sweeping changes in the corporate loan 
market that have caused it to converge rapidly with the bond market, putting tremendous 
pressure on the two markets’ differing regulatory treatment. Part V first describes how this 
convergence creates a natural experiment testing the effectiveness of the securities laws in 
the debt markets. With both issuers and investors increasingly viewing these two liquid 
markets—one regulated, the other not—as substitutes,16 the securities laws applicable to 
corporate debt appear to be having little beneficial effect. Part V then concludes by 
addressing policy implications.
II. Mandatory Disclosure: What Do We Know?
A. Empirical Testing: Technical Concerns
Capital, like all good things in this world, is scarce. Firms compete with one another 
for it, and convincing investors to part with their money for a time is no simple matter. A 
firm’s value is not readily observable or verifiable by investors. Some level of corporate 
disclosure is therefore necessary to entice wary investors and to achieve an efficient 
allocation of capital among firms.17 This much is clear. Less clear is whether such 
disclosure ought to be mandated, as it is currently for issuers of “securities” under federal 
law, or purely voluntary.
Testing whether mandatory disclosure actually works has been a tantalizing 
possibility since the halcyon days of U.S. securities regulation in the 1930s. Yet despite 80 
years of broad, intensive securities regulation, we appear little closer to a conclusive, 
empirically grounded result. It is safe to say that there is widespread agreement on two 
seemingly conflicting points: (1) empirical testing of the securities laws is a worthy and, in 
fact, crucial pursuit, and (2) such testing is plagued with conceptual and practical 
difficulties that have rendered the results largely inconclusive. This section briefly reviews 
the most salient empirical studies of mandatory disclosure and their critiques.18 Except
16. See Bessembinder & Maxwell, supra note 4, at 230 (describing syndicated loans as “a substitute for 
corporate bonds”); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation o f the U.S. Financial Services Industry. 1975- 
2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. III. L. Rev. 215, 379 (2002) (noting that 
borrowers often view syndicated loans and bonds as substitutes); Yener Altunbas et al., Large Debt Financing: 
Syndicated Loans Versus Corporate Bonds (European Central Bank, Working Paper No. 1028, 2009), available 
at papers.ssm.com/sol 3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=l 349667 (referring to the syndicated loan market as “the most 
powerful substitute to the corporate bond markets” in the eurozone).
17. Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, Information Asymmetry, Corporate Disclosure, and the Capital 
Markets: A Review o f the Empirical Disclosure Literature, 31 J. A cer . & Econ. 405, 406 (2001).
18. See generally Anne Beyer et al., The Financial Reporting Environment: A Review of the Recent 
Literature, 50 J. ACCT. & Econ . 296 (2010) (reviewing in detail the empirical literature on mandatory disclosure).
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where noted, mandatory disclosure as used in this Article refers to required disclosures at 
issuance of a security (such as the registration statement for an initial public offering),19 
and the ongoing, periodic disclosure by large issuers (such as 8-K, 10-Q, and 10-K 
filings),20 as well as to federal antifraud liability applied to issuers of securities and their 
underwriters.21
In randomized drug trials—the gold standard for testing a treatment’s effectiveness— 
the outcomes of the treatment group are compared to those of a control group, with patients 
randomly assigned to one of the two groups. The desired outcome—improvement in the 
patient’s treated condition—is clearly specified and measurable. When mandatory 
disclosure is the “treatment” to be tested, however, we quickly depart from the drug-trial 
ideal. Certain difficulties are common to all empirical testing of regulation, and indeed to 
all empirical testing in the social sciences, but some are particular to, or exacerbated in, the 
context of securities regulation.
For one thing, we lack a true control group.22 One could imagine a new disclosure 
rule applying only to half of all public companies, with those subjected to the law 
determined by lottery or a random number generator. While empiricists would no doubt 
welcome such an optimized research design, obvious political concerns preclude the 
possibility. Instead, securities laws apply to all companies, transactions, or actors satisfying 
certain criteria, leaving no control group for empirical testing.
An alternative approach is to use the unregulated group most closely resembling the 
regulated group as an ersatz control group. But of course, by definition the regulated and 
unregulated groups have different ex ante characteristics, they are taken from different 
samples, making any conclusions speculative. For example, municipal bonds, which are 
exempt from mandatory disclosure, are often touted as a true counterpoint to (regulated) 
corporate bonds.23 But the two markets cover very different types of issuers: governmental
In addition to the empirical projects reviewed in this Article, there is a considerable body of work testing the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s effects. Because the latter imposed additional disclosure obligations as well as significant 
corporate governance-related changes on public companies, this literature is less useful in isolating the specific 
impact of mandatory disclosure.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2012).
20. 15 U.S.C. §78o(d) (2012).
21. This Article takes the somewhat unusual approach of grouping together under the rubric “mandatory 
disclosure” (i) the specific disclosure rules for securities registration under the Securities Act of 1933 [hereinafter, 
the ’33 Act], (ii) the on-going disclosure obligations for certain large issuers under the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 [hereinafter, the ’34 Act], and (iii) the antifraud provisions applicable to securities issuers and 
underwriters under Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the ’33 Act and Rule 10b-5 of the ’34 Act. Rule 10b-5, for 
example, though styled as an enforcement mechanism, functionally amounts to an additional information 
disclosure requirement. By rendering issuers liable for failing to disclose material information if  omitting to do 
so would be misleading, Rule 10b-5 sets a floor on the information disclosed to investors and sets a standard 
(“materiality”) for its content. While the ’33 Act and ’34 Act mandatory disclosure provisions differ in approach 
from Rule 1 Ob-5 by specifically listing the information to be disclosed and mandating its format, at base all three 
sets of provisions mandate the production of material information by issuers for the benefit of investors.
22. This problem is not specific to securities regulation, but is common to virtually all empirical testing in 
the social sciences.
23. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case fo r  a Mandatory Disclosure 
System, 70 VA. L. Rev. 717, 744-46 (1984) (discussing obtaining “an inferential understanding of the impact of 
mandatory disclosure” by looking “at the differences between the disclosure level within the public securities
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entities versus for-profit companies. Investors may well require significantly different 
disclosure from municipalities than from private corporations, making any comparison 
between the two groups tenuous.
A second-best approach to the pure drug-trial method is to compare the before-and- 
aftcr results of introducing regulation solely for the treatment group. This “event study” 
approach is taken by the vast majority of empirical studies of securities regulation.24 In his 
seminal, though much criticized 1964 work, George Stigler compared the abnormal returns 
and variance in returns of newly public companies from a pre-Depression period to those 
in a post-Depression (and therefore post-mandatory disclosure) period.25 He found no 
difference in return results between the two groups and a reduction in variance in the post­
regulation group. On this basis, Stigler concluded that securities regulation had provided 
no benefit to investors and had had the unfortunate side-effect of excluding small 
companies from the market altogether.26
Unfortunately, the event study approach typically suffers from two major defects: (1) 
the endogeneity of securities regulation effects, and (2) the duration and complexity of the 
regulatory process.27 The first problem exists because changes in securities regulation 
typically arise in response to significant changes in the markets (such as financial crises, 
technological or financial innovation, etc.), complicating the task of isolating the effects of 
securities regulation from other changes to the markets. Most notoriously, Stigler’s finding 
of a reduction in stock-return variance following the birth of mandatory disclosure could 
equally well be explained by the Great Depression itself, which put many high-risk, opaque 
firms out of existence. The lengthy and complex regulatory process also complicates 
empirical testing. Markets may react to potential legislation well before it is enacted, 
making it difficult to pinpoint the correct “before” and “after” periods to isolate for 
comparison.28 Due to these imperfections in research design, commentators have relied on
market subject to the SEC regulation and the level that prevails within the one major securities market that is 
exempt from registration—the municipal bond market”).
24. See generally George J. Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation o f the 
Securities Exchange Act o f1934, 63 Am . Econ. Rev . 132 (1973) (examining the effects of the ’34 Act’s financial 
disclosure requirements); Carol J. Simon, The Effect o f the 1933 Securities Act on Investor Information and the 
Performance o f New Issues, T9 Am . Econ. Rev . 295, 313 (1989) (examining the effects of the ’33 Act on firms’ 
stock returns); George J. Stigler, Public Regulation o f the Securities Markets, 37 J. Bus. 117, 120 (1964) 
(examining the effects on new-issue stock returns before and after the SEC imposed mandatory disclosure). For 
more recent work in this area, see generally Brian J. Bushee & Christian Leuz, Economic Consequences o f SEC 
Disclosure Regulation: Evidence from the OTC Bulletin Board, 39 J. ACCT. & Econ. 233 (2005), examining firm- 
specific consequences of the SEC’s disclosure regulations on previously unregulated market segments.
25. Stigler, supra note 24, at 122.
26. Id. at 124.
27. J. Harold Mulherin, Measuring the Costs and Benefits o f Regulation: Conceptual Issues in Securities 
Markets, 13 J. Corp. Fin . 421,424 (2007).
28. Alan Ferrell seems to have avoided this endogeneity problem in his study of the 1964 imposition of ’ 34 
Act mandatory disclosure on companies whose stock traded on the over-the-counter (OTC) market. See generally 
Allen Ferrell, Mandatory Disclosure and Stock Returns: Evidence from the over-the-Counter Market, 36 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 213 (2007). Fortuitously, the legislative change occurred at a time of relative calm in the markets. Id. 
Ferrell interprets his findings of a reduction in volatility and positive abnormal stock returns as suggesting that 
mandatory disclosure did provide investors some benefit. Id.
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the very same empirical studies to reach opposing conclusions as to the securities laws’ 
effectiveness.29
A final approach, of more recent vintage, is the cross-sectional regression analysis of 
securities regulation’s effects (and particular components thereof) on the development of a 
country’s stock market. Problems with this multi-country regression analysis include the 
limited number of data points30 and, perhaps more troubling, the inherent ambiguity in the 
direction of causation: do features such as mandatory disclosure explain the success of a 
country’s securities markets, or is it the other way around?31
B. Empirical Testing: Doctrinal Concerns—The Benefits and Costs o f Mandatory
Disclosure
Beyond these sampling and technical difficulties, the considerable uncertainty 
regarding both the desired outcome and the possible side effects of the treatments to be 
measured and modeled hamper empirical studies. Empirical testing of securities regulation 
requires an economic theory of regulation—usually falling within either the public-interest 
or the special-interest32 framework—as this framing determines the hypotheses to be 
tested, the interpretation of the results, the burden of proof, the statistical power, and the 
captured unintended consequences.33 What, then, are the benefits that the securities laws 
aim to achieve, and what are their costs?
The securities laws’ possible benefits34 have been variously described. They include: 
preventing unsophisticated investors from making risky investments,35 ensuring that
29. See Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 Yale 
L.J. 2359, 2376 (1998) (relying on both Stigler and Benston for her claim that mandatory disclosure is not 
effective); see Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice is Not Investor 
Empowerment, 85 Va . L. Rev. 1335 (1999) (reaching the opposite conclusion by critiquing Stigler, Benston, and 
Simon); see also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms o f  Market Efficiency, 70 Va . L. Rev. 
549,636-38 (1984) (critiquing Benston’s conclusion that the 34 Act’s lack of impact on stock prices demonstrated 
that the legislation had no beneficial effects).
30. The most frequently cited study, by La Porta et al., includes only 49 countries. See Rafael La Porta et 
al., What Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J. Fin. 1, 5 (2006).
31. Id. at 14. Other more technical criticisms of the approach taken in the La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & 
Shleifer study involve (i) the construction of its indices and (ii) its reliance on the law on the books, rather than 
as applied or circumvented over time by judges and practitioners. See, e.g., Howell E. Jackson & Mark .1. Roe, 
Public and Private Enforcement o f Securities Laws: Resource-Based Evidence, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 207, 209-10 
(2009) (describing the problems with authority-based enforcement indexes); Paul G. Mahoney, The Development 
o f  Securities Law in the United States, A l J. Acct. Res. 325, 326 (2009) (stressing the distinction between law as 
enacted and law as applied); Holger Spamann, The ‘‘Antidirector Rights Index" Revisited, 23 Rev. Fin. STUD. 
467, 470-72 (2010) (critiquing the construction of the La Porta et al. index).
32. See Richard A. Posner, Theories o f  Economic Regulation, 5 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. SCI. 335, 343 
(1974) (describing the special-interest theory of regulation).
33. Mulherin, supra note 27, at 421-22.
34. See Theresa A. Gabaldon, The Disclosure o f  Preliminary Merger Negotiations as an Imperfect 
Paradigm o f  Rule 10b-5 Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1218, 1249-51 (1987) (giving an overview of key policy 
justifications for the federal securities laws in general, and anti-fraud liability in particular).
35. Low net-worth, retail investors are effectively prohibited from investing in many financial assets, 
including much of private equity, hedge funds, and private debt issuances, under SEC rules that limit such 
investments to accredited investors or qualified institutional buyers.
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investors are adequately informed before making risky investments,36 improving the 
allocational efficiency of capital markets,37 preventing fraud by issuers and 
intermediaries,38 correcting inefficiencies in the production of material investment 
information,39 standardizing disclosure practices among issuers,40 controlling specific 
managerial or promoter agency problems,41 and helping established firms create barriers 
to entry for new firms.42 As will be discussed in Part V, in the case of mandatory 
disclosure, the various goals fall within two broad categories. This whittling down still 
does not ease the difficulty of the task in most cases, however, as the two candidates may 
directly conflict with one another.43
Even if we agree on the goal and find evidence that it has been achieved, how should 
we weigh the benefits of this outcome against the inevitable costs associated with it? 
Securities regulation is not free:44 it imposes additional costs on issuers and other market 
actors, and requires government expenditures on regulation and enforcement.45 Direct 
private costs of mandatory disclosure include the time and effort of management, and direct 
expenditures on underwriters, lawyers, and accountants.46 And the indirect costs of 
mandatory disclosure likely exceed the direct costs. For example, the sizable direct costs 
of mandatory disclosure may preclude small issuers from accessing the public markets for 
financing, thereby increasing their cost of capital and skewing investment.47 Other indirect
36. See, e.g., Stigler, supra note 24, at 120 (analyzing mandatory disclosure).
37. Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Komhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities 
Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 761, 802 (1985).
38. See, e.g., James D. Cox, Premises for Reforming the Regulation o f Securities Offerings: An Essay, 63 
Law & CONTEMP. Probs. 11,12 (2000) (discussing the goals of securities regulation).
39. See generally Coffee, supra note 23.
40. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 1, at 700-01 (naming the federal securities regulation’s 
features).
41. See Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
1047, 1048 (1995) (arguing that “the principal purpose of mandatory disclosure is to address certain agency 
problems that arise between corporate promoters and investors, and between corporate managers and 
shareholders”); see also Manuel A. Utset, Towards a Bargaining Theory o f the Firm, 80 CORNELL L. Rev. 540, 
598-99 (1995) (describing managerial disclosure requirements).
42. Paul G. Mahoney, The Political Economy o f the Securities Act o f1933, 30 J. Legal Stud. 1,18 (2001).
43. Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 14, at 340 (noting that securities regulation’s two goals do not 
always coincide).
44. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 1, at 708-09 (describing indirect costs).
45. To add to the difficulty of measuring the costs of mandatory disclosure, we cannot simply add up all of 
the direct and indirect costs of disclosure, as this would significantly overstate the costs of regulation. Even in the 
absence of any mandatory disclosure requirement, issuers will expend resources to disclose some information, in 
order to attract investors. Id. at 682-83 (describing how firms have an interest in providing disclosure to 
investors). Thus, the relevant costs of mandatory disclosure to be measured are the incremental costs incurred 
under a mandatory disclosure regime. Id. at 708 (stating that the incremental costs of marginal disclosure might 
be small, because issuers would disclose considerable information even in the absence of disclosure). This 
requires a counter-factual guess as to what amount and type of information issuers would generate in the absence 
of mandatory disclosure. Needless to say, this is a difficult task. Id. (stating that “[w]e do not know what things 
firms would disclose, and to whom, in the absence of the securities laws.”).
46. Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 14, at 367.
47. Stigler, supra note 24, at 122. Under a special-interest theory of regulation, this effect would be the goal 
of mandatory disclosure, rather than an unintended consequence.
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costs include the additional delay and uncertainty in capital raising,48 the potential for 
liability associated with any material disclosures,49 and the forced disclosure of sensitive 
or proprietary company information to competitors.50
Some of these side effects may be directly antithetical to the original goals of 
regulation: for example, if mandatory disclosure lulls unsophisticated investors into a false 
sense of safety, 51 or leads to less monitoring and production of information by other market 
actors, the securities laws may be counter-productive to the goal of helping investors make 
better decisions.52 The profound difficulties with identifying and measuring the costs and 
benefits of mandatory disclosure (and securities regulation in general) have led many to 
conclude, along with Donald Langevoort and Robert Thompson, that “[m]ost all of 
securities regulation is educated guesswork rather than rigorous cost-benefit analysis 
because we lack the ability to capture the full range of possible costs or benefits with 
anything remotely resembling precision.” 53
What, then, do we know about whether mandatory disclosure is effective? In 
summarizing the empirical and more conceptual tests of the securities laws’ effectiveness, 
J. Harold Mulherin54 tentatively concludes that, on balance, securities regulation has not 
provided demonstrable material benefits.55 Merritt Fox argues the opposite.56 
Unfortunately, we appear to know very little.
48. See Cox, supra note 38, at 17-18 (describing indirect costs of mandatory disclosure).
49. Id. at 17.
50. See Fox, supra note 29, at 1345-46 (stating that private and social costs diverge). For general 
discussions of the costs of mandatory disclosure, see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 1, at 707-14, describing 
costs and benefits of disclosure; see also Geoffrey A. Manne, The Hydraulic Theory o f Disclosure Regulation 
and Other Costs o f Disclosure, 58 Ala. L. Rev. 473, 479-85 (2007) (reviewing literature on costs and benefits 
of disclosure).
51. See, e.g., Ripken, supra note 10, at 141-42 (stating that many believe the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms do 
nothing more than “fooling investors into a false sense of confidence”).
52. This should only be the case if the market is not efficient, however, in the sense of incorporating all 
public information into the stock price. In an efficient market, investors should be “protected” by mandatory 
disclosure regardless of whether they are even aware of it. See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, 
The Mechanisms o f Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715 (2003); Donald 
C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits o f the Stock Markets: A Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 
97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 135 (2002), for summaries of the competing views and evidence on market efficiency.
53. Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 14, at 361. For much the same reasons, the D.C. Circuit’s recent 
insistence on full-blown cost-benefit analyses for the SEC rulemaking has been widely critiqued by the legal 
academy. See, e.g., John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis o f Financial Regulation: Case Studies and 
Implications, (Harvard Law School European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI), Working Paper No. 
234/2014, 2014), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=2375396 (providing case studies of regulation and their 
implications for cost-benefit analysis); Robert B. Ahdieh, Reanalyzing Cost-Benefit Analysis: Toward a 
Framework o f Functionfs) and Form(s), 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1983 (2013); James D. Cox & Benjamin J.C. Baucom, 
The Emperor Has No Clothes: Confronting the D.C. Circuit's Usurpation o f SEC Rulemaking Authority, 90 Tex. 
L. Rev. 1811, 1840 (2012).
54. Mulherin, supra note 27, at 432.
55. See also Healy & Palepu, supra note 17, at 414 (concluding that “surprisingly little is known about why 
financial reporting and disclosure is regulated in the capital market”).
56. Fox, supra note 29, at 1416 (concluding that disclosure serves several socially beneficial functions).
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III. L o a n s  v s . B o n d s : T h e  T r a d it io n a l  P a r a d ig m s  
A. Description o f  Dichotomy
When a firm borrows money today, it can, in theory, select any point on a near- 
continuous range of more or less exotic debt instruments. But from the birth of developed 
capital markets in the U.S. until only a few decades ago, the choice was largely confined 
to one of two major paradigms: the private bank loan and the public bond. Traditional bank 
loans tend to occupy the highest priority in a company’s capital structure: senior loans 
secured by all of the company’s assets.57 Their terms are generally specified in loan or 
credit agreements containing highly restrictive covenants, which give the bank both veto 
rights over the borrower’s major corporate transactions (such as additional debt 
incurrences, dividends, mergers, and major asset sales) and the ability to accelerate the loan 
at the first hint of financial distress. Why would a company agree to such provisions? The 
short answer is that, particularly for small, opaque companies, there may be no alternative 
to bank funding.58 Because bank loans are usually secured by the company’s assets, and 
banks are specialized in monitoring such idiosyncratic borrowers, banks can provide these 
loans at relatively low interest rates.59 In exchange, they require tight controls over the 
borrowing firm.60
Such bank loans thus necessarily involve long-term relationships between a given 
bank and a given firm: the bank invests substantial resources on due diligence and ongoing 
monitoring of the borrower,61 and the private information that it gleans through this 
process cannot readily be transferred to other parties. As described here, a bank loan is 
necessarily a wholly illiquid debt instrument. The originating bank will end up holding it 
until maturity,62 simply because no other party will value it as much as the bank does: 
potential third-party purchasers, lacking the bank’s private information about the borrower,
57. The Loan Syndications & Trading Ass’n , Through the Cycle: Senior Secured Loans Poised 
to Perform 4 (2013), available at http://www.lsta.org/hubsub.aspx?id=70.
58. See Charles 1C. Whitehead, The Evolution o f Debt: Covenants, the Credit Market, and Corporate 
Governance, 34 J. CORP. L. 641, 664 (2009) (noting that less information is available about private borrowers 
than public ones).
59. See Douglas W. Diamond, Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring, 51 Rev . Econ. Stud. 
393, 393 (1984) (developing a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring 
borrowers).
60. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever o f Corporate 
Governance, 154 U. Pa . L. Rev. 1209, 1227-28 (2006) (discussing how loan covenants give lenders de facto 
control over the borrower); Joel Houston & Christopher James, Bank Information Monopolies and the Mix of 
Private and Public Debt Claims, 51 J. Fin. 1863, 1866 (1996) (noting the significant control that lenders of private 
debt exert over borrowing companies).
61. Monitoring might consist of examining the borrower’s collateral, testing compliance with the 
covenants, reviewing the company’s financial statements, and meeting frequently with management.
62. See Standard & Poor’s, A Guide to the Loan Market 15 (2011), available at 
https://www.lcdcomps.com/d/pdf/LoanMarketguide.pdf (“In the old days . . . .  [l]oans sat on the books of banks 
and stayed there.”).
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will discount the value of the loan accordingly. This is the essence of private debt, or 
relationship banking.63
At the other end of the spectrum from the small, opaque borrowers that classically 
relied on bank loans, we have very large, mature companies with well-understood business 
models and track records of providing reliable returns to their investors. Their cheapest 
option for large borrowings will be to issue bonds to the general public. Due to their size 
and established performance, retail investors are willing to purchase their bonds, 
notwithstanding retail investors’ lack of incentives or ability to monitor the borrowing 
companies directly.64 Traditional public bonds are longer-term (e.g., 30-year), unsecured 
borrowings at fixed interest rates. As widely traded instruments underwritten by large 
investment banks, bonds may be highly liquid instruments, in stark contrast to the 
traditional bank loan. Finally, bond indentures typically contain significantly less 
restrictive covenants than loan agreements.65
The private bank loan and the public bond have thus long been understood as opposing 
paradigms of corporate debt financing. The senior secured bank loan “market” was almost 
by definition perfectly illiquid and monopolized by banks. The unsecured bond market was 
both deep and liquid, with a major retail-investor presence. Table 1 below summarizes the 
traditional characteristics of loans and bonds described above.
Table 1. Traditional Characteristics of Bank Loans and Public Bonds
Bank Loans Public Bonds
Lender Single bank Dispersed investors, including retail
Liquidity Very low High
Lender Monitoring Intensive Limited
Covenants Tight Loose
Credit Protection Secured Unsecured
B. Treatment Under the Securities Laws
If these traditional paradigms still held true for corporate loans and bonds, it would be 
difficult to find fault with their opposing treatment under the federal securities laws. Bank 
loans are the most commonly cited example of a non-security, while public bonds are very 
clearly understood to be securities, and are therefore subject to mandatory disclosure, 
among other requirements.66 The traditional bank loan is not viewed as requiring the
63. See, e.g., Sreedhar T. Bharath et al., Lending Relationships and Loan Contract Terms, 24 REV. Fin. 
Stud. 1141, 1141-42 (2011) (explaining information asymmetry’s role in the development o f  financial 
intermediaries).
64. See Yakov Amihud et al., A New Governance Structure for Corporate Bonds, 51 STAN. L . REV. 447, 
452-69 (1999) (examining governance structures for corporate debt).
65. Infra Part IV.B.
66. The very first paragraphs of the most widely used corporate finance textbook in business schools 
worldwide include the following statement: “An ordinary bank loan is not a security . . . because it is held by the 
bank and not sold or traded in financial markets . . . .  The bond is a . . .  security, because it can be held and traded
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protections of the federal securities laws, given that: retail investors play no part in the 
corporate loan market; banks are themselves tightly regulated entities; credit agreements 
provide significant contractual protections for the lender (covenants and collateral), making 
them less risky—all else being equal—than bonds; and bank loans require substantial 
monitoring by the lender.67 Moreover, compliance with the mandatory disclosure 
provisions of the securities laws would usually be impossible or excessively costly for the 
small, opaque companies that tend to be the most common borrowers of bank loans.
In contrast, the paradigmatic public bonds are explicitly marketed to retail investors 
as long-term investments and may be readily traded, arguably making the ongoing 
availability of information about the issuer crucial. Clearly there can be no real expectation 
of monitoring by retail investors. Thus, the publicly issued bond has historically been 
viewed as demanding the mandatory disclosure apparatus.
IV. L o a n s  v s . B o n d s : C o n v e r g e n c e
The contrasting paradigms of bank loans and public bonds persisted virtually 
untouched for decades following the Securities Acts’ introduction of mandatory disclosure. 
But over the last 30 years (and particularly the last 15), they have been turned on their 
heads, primarily owing to radical changes in the bank loan market.68 The shift from 
traditional relationship banking to the syndication and secondary trading of loans has been 
both swift and sweeping.69 The gospel of the banking industry—that bank loans may not 
be traded—was forgotten in a matter of years. And when the smoke cleared, the business 
of commercial banking began to look much like the business of investment banking, and 
the loan market began to resemble its erstwhile opposite, the bond market. Sub-parts A and 
B below describe what brought about these changes and how they manifested.
A. Causes
1. Changes to the Loan Market
The seismic shifts in the corporate loan market were prompted by changes in both 
companies’ demands for loans and creditors’ supply of capital to the loan market. On the 
demand side, the appearance and rapid popularity of the leveraged buyout in the early 
1980s significantly increased companies’ appetite for taking on debt.70 It also prompted a
by many investors in financial markets.” Richard A. Brealey et al„ Principles of Corporate Finance 2 
(11th ed. 2014).
67. See Whitehead, supra note 58, at 641—42 (affirming banks use covenants and monitoring to minimize 
the risk of loss on their loans).
68. See id. at 651-52 (charting the decline in traditional banking in the last 30 years).
69. See Wilmarth, supra note 16, at 381—82 (describing the largest banks’ change in business model from 
relationship banking to syndicated lending and securitization).
70. A leveraged buyout is a corporate acquisition in which the buyer, a “private equity” investment fund, 
purchases a controlling stake in the target, using only a small portion of its own funds. Steven N. Kaplan & Per 
Stromberg, Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 121,121, 123-25 (2009). The bulk of the 
purchase price (typically 60-90%) is funded by additional debt taken on by the target company at the time of the 
transaction. Id. at 124.
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radical shift in companies’ understanding of the role of debt in their capital structure. Debt 
had long been viewed as either something to avoid entirely or as a necessary evil to address 
the business’s specific operational needs. With the advent of leveraged buyouts, however, 
companies began taking on debt for non-operational reasons, that is, for shareholder-driven 
reasons.71 With private equity in particular, debt became an end in itself: with higher 
leverage, private equity firms could acquire ever-larger companies (that would otherwise 
be immune to takeovers) and amplify returns to investors,72 while ensuring optimal 
incentives to ensure their investments’ success. Leveraged-buyout targets thus drove a 
substantial increase in the demand for large corporate loans.
The supply side of the corporate loan market experienced even greater upheavals over 
this period. The end result was a complete reversal in the structure and composition of 
corporate lending, best described as the shift from an “originate-and-hold” model to an 
“originate-to-distribute” one.73 The initial prompt for this shift was the deregulation of the 
banking industry, particularly the erosion of the divide between commercial banking 
(taking deposits from customers and making commercial loans) and investment banking 
(underwriting and trading securities). Coming on the heels of the Great Depression, the 
Glass-Steagall Act74 aimed to make households’ bank deposits more secure by prohibiting 
depositary banks from engaging in risky activities such as investment banking. While the 
goal was to keep banks out of other financial sectors, it also had the effect of shielding the 
banking business from competition from other financial institutions. But with the gradual 
paring back of Glass-Steagall and its final repeal in 1999 (with the passage of the Gramm- 
Leach-Bliley Act75), the neat divide between commercial and investment banking 
crumbled, and serious incursions were made across both sides of the aisle.
Now facing competition from insurance companies, investment banks, and mutual 
funds banks were forced into new lines of business to maintain profits. To add to the banks’ 
woes, their traditional source of funds (consumer deposits) began to decline, as new 
alternatives for households to safely place their money arose, such as money market funds. 
Many banks fell by the wayside, and the industry as a whole experienced major 
consolidation. On the lending side, investment banks began competing with bank loans by 
offering companies new options for debt financing, such as issuing short-term commercial 
paper.76
The major triggering event for change in the traditional loan funding model was the 
shift in U.S. capital requirements for banks, best exemplified by the Revised Basel Capital
71. See Ulf Axelson et al., Why Are Buyouts Levered? The Financial Structure o f Private Equity Funds, 64 
J. Fin. 1549,1556 (2009) (explaining the incentives that drive leveraged buyout firms to maximize the use of debt 
in acquisitions).
72. See Robert P. Bartlett III, Taking Finance Seriously: How Debt Financing Distorts Bidding Outcomes 
in Corporate Takeovers, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 1975,1980 (2008) (describing how debt financing is an advantage 
for leveraged-buyout firms over competing bidders for target companies).
73. Katerina Simons, Why Do Banks Syndicate Loans?, New Eng . Econ. Rev . 45, 45-46 (Jan.1993), 
available at http://www.bostonfed.org/economic/neer/neerl993/neerl93c.pdf.
74. The Glass-Steagall Act was the popular name for the Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89,48 Stat. 162 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
75. Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102 (1999) (codified in scattered 
sections of 12, 15, 16, 18 U.S.C.).
76. See Whitehead, supra note 58, at 654-55 (describing the evolution of the credit market).
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Accord (“Basel II”).77 With Basel II, bank regulators jumped with both feet onto the 
bandwagon of modem portfolio theory and revised bank capital requirements so as to 
incentivize banks to diversify their assets—until then a radical notion. Practically speaking, 
banks were henceforth punished for holding a small number of large loans on their balance 
sheets and rewarded for holding small portions of many loans. When the assets in question 
were securities, diversification posed little problem for banks. But with loans, the pressing 
question became: how could a bank hold a diversified portfolio of loans without originating 
all of them? Further, how could a bank transfer large loans that it had originated off its 
books? Recall that there was no real ability to parse and trade loans at the time. Thus, there 
was urgent demand for a mechanism by which portions of corporate loans could be 
offloaded from the originating bank to other banks and, eventually, to other types of 
institutions.78
This is how the practice of loan syndication and secondary trading arose and quickly 
became the world’s largest source of corporate financing.79 With loan syndication, a major 
bank referred to as the lead arranger negotiates the key terms of the loan with the borrowing 
company, and then organizes a syndicate of lenders to fund it.80 Post-funding, if the loan 
is large enough it will be traded to still other investors on a secondary market. Even the 
lead arranger may end up holding only a small portion of the loan through this process, or 
sell off its stake entirely.8' Thus, syndication and secondary trading introduced several 
bond-like features to the loan market that were previously unimaginable: a dispersed lender 
base of predominantly non-bank lenders, light monitoring, and liquidity. The bank’s role 
in this brave new world shifted from funding, monitoring, and holding the loan (an 
“originate-and-hold” model) to finding other investors for the loan and administering the 
credit relationship (an “originate-to-distribute” model).82
While banks now hold an increasingly small share of corporate loans, non-bank 
institutional investors have enthusiastically entered the market and rapidly surpassed banks
77. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel II: International Convergence o f Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework, Bank FOR International SETTLEMENTS (June 
2004), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl07.htm (establishing what it calls more “risk-sensitive” capital 
requirements). For a description of the impact of Basel II, see generally Robert F. Hugi et al., U.S. Adoption of 
Basel IIand the Basel IISecuritization Framework, 12 N.C. BANKING INST. 45,48 (2008) (summarizing the final 
rules the U.S. federal bank regulators issued “to implement the Basel II advanced internal rating-based approach 
to bank capital adequacy in the United States”).
78. See Yener Altunbas et al., Syndicated Loans: A Hybrid of Relationship Lending and 
Publicly Traded Debt 102 (2006) (describing how syndicated loans enable banks and other financial 
institutions to satisfy their capital requirements and diversify their portfolios).
79. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side o f Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and the Origins 
o f the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 Conn. L. Rev. 963, 982 (2009).
80. See Allison A. Taylor & Ruth Yang, Evolution o f the Primary and Secondary Leveraged Loan Markets, 
in The Handbook of Loan Syndications and Trading 21, 23-24 (Allison Taylor & Alicia Sansone eds., 
2007) (explaining the origin and growth of the syndicated loan market).
81. For descriptions of loan syndication, see Victoria Ivashina & Zheng Sun, Institutional Demand Pressure 
and the Cost o f Corporate Loans, 99 J. Fin. Econ. 500, 503-08 (2011); Wilmarth, supra note 79, at 981-82.
82. The latter function has proved highly lucrative for the major investment and commercial banks that 
dominate the lead arranger market. See Barry Bobrow et al., The Primary Market, in The Handbook OF LOAN 
Syndications and Trading 155, 172 (Allison Taylor & Alicia Sansone eds., 2007) (stating that the top three 
lead arrangers together covered 47% of the total syndicated loan market in 2005).
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in market share.83 In particular, securitization vehicles referred to as collateralized loan 
obligations (CLOs) now hold up to 60% of the market.84 Other institutional investors in 
the loan market include pension funds, mutual funds, hedge funds, insurance companies, 
finance companies, and foreign institutions.85
2. Changes to the Bond Market
While the bond market was less uprooted than the loan market over this period, there 
were nonetheless two key developments that contributed to its convergence with the loan 
market. First, the early 1980s witnessed the development of a high-risk segment of the 
market, the high-yield (or so-called “junk bond”) market. Once again prompted by the 
leveraged-buyout appetite for large debt financing, Michael Milken at now-defunct 
investment bank Drexel Burnham and Lambert introduced a new debt product to the public, 
bonds promising very high yields and used to finance takeovers and other leveraged 
recapitalizations.86 Bonds were no longer the exclusive province of blue-chip, low- 
leverage borrowers.
Second, the direct retail investor gradually began to withdraw from the bond 
markets.87 Retail investors have been receding to varying degrees in all of the public 
markets, primarily because their participation is now funneled through intermediaries such 
as mutual funds and pension funds.88 Yet the phenomenon is even more pronounced in the 
corporate bond markets, where the direct retail investor has now all but disappeared. There 
are several plausible explanations for why this might be so. First, unlike the equity markets, 
corporate bonds are now traded almost exclusively through dealers,89 rather than on 
exchanges, making access difficult for direct retail investors. Second, the institutional 
demand for fixed-income products is so great that there is little incentive to court or even
83. Glenn Yago & Donald McCarthy, The U.S. Leveraged Loan Market: A Primer, Milken Inst. 26-27 
(2004), available at https://www.milkeninstitute.org/pdf/loan_primer_1004.pdf (describing how prime funds, 
CLOs, finance companies, and insurers have replaced banks as the secondary markets’ major investor).
84. Through the process of securitization, pieces of many different syndicated loans are packaged into a 
single vehicle, which then issues different tranches of securities to investors, thus enabling them to invest in a 
diversified portfolio of loans relatively cheaply.
85. Bartlett, supra note 72, at 2013.
86. See Glenn Yago, Junk Bonds: How High Yield Securities Restructured Corporate America 
20-26 (1991) (describing the history of the “junk bond revolution”).
87. See James D. Cox et al., Securities Regulation: Cases and Materials 560 (7th ed. 2013) 
(“[Bjond markets are almost exclusively an institutional medium, i.e., retail investors compose a very small 
percentage of bond trading.”).
88. See Alicia Davis Evans, A Requiem For the Retail Investor? 95 VA. L. Rev . 1105, 1105 (2009) (stating 
that retail investors account for less than 2% of NYSE’s trading volume); Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail 
Investors, and the Institutionalization o f the Securities Markets, 95 Va . L. Rev . 1025, 1026 n.4 (2009) (noting 
that the total value of securities that households own directly has not declined).
89. Cox ET AL., supra note 87, at 560.
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accommodate the retail investor.90 As one example, the minimum denominations for bond 
purchases are significantly larger than for stock.91
An astonishing feature of the various triggers for change in the loan and bond markets 
is that none involved a change in the treatment of either loans or bonds under the securities 
laws.92 The loan market went from an illiquid, bank-driven market to a full-fledged, 
disintermediated capital market without any loosening or tightening of the securities laws.
B. Evidence
The changes to the loan and bond markets described above have resulted in a striking 
and rapid convergence, particularly at the riskiest end of the spectrum in each. Both 
investors and issuers now view leveraged loans, which are loans to borrowers that have a 
high proportion of debt in their capital structure (such as private equity-owned companies), 
as substitutes for high-yield bonds.93 This convergence manifests most strikingly in their 
respective investors, pricing, liquidity, covenants, and credit features.
1. Investors
As discussed above, the number and type of creditors for corporate loans has changed 
dramatically as a direct result of the syndication and secondary trading of loans. Syndicated 
loans are held by large groups of dispersed creditors, consisting primarily of non-bank 
institutional investors having no relationship with the borrowing company.94 Given the 
gradual disappearance of the direct retail investor, the bond market is also now dominated 
by institutional investors.95 While loans and bonds began with dramatically different 
creditors, they now overlap very significantly, particularly in the high-yield space.
2. Pricing
The pricing of the loan and bond markets has converged as well, and over a very short 
period of time.96 Using data from the late 1980s and early 1990s, Angbazo, Mei and 
Saunders found that leveraged loan pricing had not yet integrated with high-yield bond
90. For regulatory or other prudential reasons, institutions such as insurance companies and pension funds 
have a strong preference for debt products over equity.
91. See Bessembinder & Maxwell, supra note 4, at 221 (describing institutional investors’ domination of 
the corporate bond market).
92. The promulgation of Rule 144A did have an indirect effect on the loan market in that it opened the door 
for a new class of creditors, securitization vehicles such as CLOs. But the Securities Acts’ regulation of loans 
remained unchanged.
93. See Bessembinder & Maxwell, supra note 4, at 230.
94. In 2012, U.S. banks held only 6.3% of U.S. leveraged loans, while CLOs and loan funds together held 
80.7%. Structured Finance Industry Group, Credit Risk Retention Re-Proposal F-9 (Oct. 30, 2013), 
http://federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2013/December/20131219/R-1411/R- 
1411J03013_111495_377905725574_l.pdf
95. See COX ET AL., supra note 87 and accompanying text (describing the withdrawal of retail investors 
from bond markets).
96. See Wilmarth, supra note 16, at 379 (noting how banks “price and market” loans and bonds in a similar 
manner).
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pricing.97 Revisiting the question with more recent data, Thomas and Wang find significant 
integration of the leveraged loan and high-yield bond markets, with pricing in the two 
markets very clearly moving together.98
3. Liquidity
Perhaps the most striking and surprising evidence of convergence is the development 
of a liquid leveraged loan market, when corporate loans were for so long the consummate 
illiquid investment. Not all syndicated loans are traded, but large leveraged loans are 
specifically designed to be traded.99 Figure 1 below depicts the surge in trading volume for 
leveraged loans from the early 1990s through the post-financial crisis period. While pricing 
in the two markets is now integrated, the leveraged loan market’s trading volume has in 
fact recently surpassed the high-yield market’s .100
97. Lazarus A. Angbazo et al., Credit Spreads in the Market for Highly Leveraged Transaction Loans, 22 
J. Banking & Fin. 1249,1249 (1998).
98. Hugh Thomas & Zhiqiang Wang, The Integration o f Bank Syndicated Loan and Junk Bond Markets, 
28 J. Banking & Fin. 229, 306 (2004).
99. There are various measures of liquidity, but one useful proxy for the liquidity of a given company’s 
debt is simply the size (principal amount) of the loan in question. Martin S. Fridson & Jeffrey A. Bersh, Measuring 
Liquidity Premiums in the High- Yield Bond Market, in The Yearbook OF FIXED Income INVESTING 84, 89 (John 
D. Finnerty & Martin S. Fridson eds., 1995). By this measure, the syndicated loan market is liquid indeed—multi- 
billion-dollar issuances are now routine.
100. The Loan Syndications & Trading Ass’n , Through the Cycle: Senior Secured Loans Poised 
to Perform, supra note 57, at 14.
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Figure 1. Leveraged Loan Trading Volume 101
4. Covenants
The once-universal truth that loans come saddled wi:h tight covenants and intensive 
creditor monitoring is also proving false, and syndication and secondary trading are again 
the culprits. While bank loans were always characterized by highly restrictive covenants, 
this feature could not peacefully coexist with funding by dispersed, unrelated creditors.102 
Tight bank loan covenants often must be amended over ihe course of Tie loan, which is 
easy when the loan is between a single bank and borrower. So long as the bank approves 
of the proposed amendment, it can be effected almost immediately. With a dispersed 
creditor base, however, collective action and holdout problems among the creditors make 
amendments difficult, time-consuming, and often very costly. If the costs are too great, the 
company might be prevented from pursuing value-creating projects or pushed into 
bankruptcy unnecessarily. In order to avoid this problem ex ante, covenants must be less 
restrictive, thereby requiring fewer amendments ex post. This explains why bond covenants
101. Secondary Loan Market Volume—US, THOMSON REUTERS L?C, hhps://www.loanpricing.com/ (last 
visited Jul. 14,2014).
102. See Wilmarth, supra note 16, at 378 (noting that syndicated loans have fewer covenants than traditional 
bank loans).
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were traditionally looser than bank loan covenants,103 and why the latter have loosened 
dramatically since the onset of loan syndication and trading.104
The adoption and rapid proliferation of “covenant-lite” loans is the most discussed 
(and criticized) manifestation of the loosening of covenants in leveraged loans.105 A 
covenant-lite loan does not prohibit the borrower from exceeding a specified leverage ratio, 
whether by taking on additional debt or simply through deteriorating performance.106 Such 
a leverage covenant is emblematic of traditional bank loans, as it gives the lender 
significant control over the borrower’s capital structure. In addition, it amounts to a tripwire 
that provides the lender with an early warning signal of potential financial distress. If a 
borrower violates the leverage covenant, the bank may be able to intervene in the 
borrower’s operations early enough to stave off insolvency, or the bank can decide to 
accelerate and exit the loan before the situation worsens. With covenant-lite loans, as with 
public bonds, lenders entirely relinquish this control over the borrower.
Covenant-lite loans first appeared in and around 2005, and rapidly became popular in 
the leveraged loan market. Because financial covenants were a defining feature of bank 
loans for so long, covenant-lite loans were dismissed as a sign of lender excess in the pre- 
financial-crisis period that would quickly be abandoned when cooler heads prevailed.107 
Yet covenant-lite loans’ market share has continued to surge post-crisis, representing up to 
35% of all leveraged loans outstanding in 2013.108 With the loosening of loan covenants 
generally, and the proliferation of covenant-lite loans in particular, leveraged loans are now
103. See Marcel Kahan & Bruce Tuckman, Private Versus Public Lending: Evidence From Covenants, in
The Yearbook of Fixed Income Investing 253,253-74 (John D. Finnerty & Martin S. Fridson eds., 1995) 
(noting one of the author’s findings that “private debt covenants require more monitoring and necessitate more 
frequent renegotiation than public debt”); Michael Bradley & Michael R. Roberts, The Structure and Pricing of 
Corporate Debt Covenants 13 (May 13, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=466240 (stating that “[i]t is clear that private debt contains far more covenants than does 
public debt”).
104. See Whitehead, supra note 58, at 643^15 (describing the expansion of loan syndication and trading).
105. See Cent Demiroglu & Christopher M. James, The Role o f Private Equity Group Reputation in LBO 
Financing, 96 J. Fin. Econ. 306, 306-09 (2010) (describing the trend of declining financial covenants associated 
with leveraged loans).
106. See Standard & Poor’s, A Guide to the Loan Market, supra note 62 at 18 (defining the term 
“covenant-lite loan”).
107. You Only Give Me Your Funny Paper: Debt Markets Turn Grouchy as Creditors Ask for More, THE 
ECONOMIST (June 28, 2007), available at http://www.economist.com/node/9413745 (describing covenant-lite 
loans entered into prior to the financial crisis as a temporary trend “that in more sober times would have had 
lenders reaching for the Alka-Seltzer”).
108. Bram Smith et al., Loan Terms & Ways to Invest in Loans, LOAN SYNDICATIONS & TRADING ASS’N,
available at http://www.lsta.org/workarea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=16747 (citing figures from Standard & 
Poor’s LCD). In February 2013 alone, the issuance of covenant-lite loans reached nearly fifty billion dollars in 
the U.S. leveraged loan market. Colm Doherty & Hugo Pereira, Thompson Reuters LPC, Leveraged 
Loan Monthly: September 2013 11 (2013), available at
http://share.thomsonreuters.com/loanpricing/LoanMonthly/LoanInvestorMthly_September2013.pdf
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frequently described as having “bond-style” covenants,109 and are drafted with virtually 
identical language and substance.110
5. Credit Features
Finally, leveraged loans are converging with high-yield bonds in their most basic 
credit features. While traditional bank loans tended to be issued as either revolving loans 
or as amortizing term loans, leveraged loans are predominantly structured as non­
amortizing (or minimally amortizing) term loans, similar to bonds.* 111 The tenor (or 
maturity) of leveraged loans and high-yield bonds is also now very similar, overlapping in 
the range of six to eight years.112
Two particularly significant differences between leveraged loan and high-yield bond 
facilities remain, however, both of which tend to make leveraged loans somewhat less 
risky, all else being equal. First, bonds still tend to provide for fixed interest, while 
leveraged loans generally pay out floating-rate interest, such that leveraged loan investors 
are not subject to interest rate risk. Second, it is still the case that leveraged loans tend to 
be secured by the borrower’s assets, while most bonds are unsecured.113 Yet here too, 
change is afoot—secured bond issuances have surged in recent years.114 And on the loan 
front, a new product, the second-lien loan, has proven wildly popular with non-bank 
investors.115 While the borrower’s assets secure such loans, they have second priority after 
the first-lien debt, and are thus highly unlikely to be fully repaid if the borrower becomes 
insolvent. Thus, they skirt the line between unsecured debt and secured debt very closely, 
and accordingly pay higher interest spreads than traditional bank debt.116 At the current 
state of convergence of the leveraged loan and high-yield bond markets, we are left with 
two products that are virtually identical from a functional standpoint. Table 2 summarizes 
the above by comparing the traditional loan and bond paradigms with the current high- 
yield bond and leveraged loan markets.
109. See Standard & Poor’s, A Guide to the Loan Market, supra note 62, at 18 (describing the bond­
like covenants o f covenant-lite loans).
110. For the seminal explanation of covenants’ functions in debt agreements, see Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & 
Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis o f  Bond Covenants, 7 J. Fin. Econ. 117, 118-19 (1979).
111. See Standard & Poor’s, A Guide to the Loan Market, supra note 62, at 16-17 (describing term 
loans).
112. See Standard & Poor’s Financial Services LLC, High Yield Bond Primer, Highyieldbond.com, 
http://www.highyieldbond.com/primer/ [hereinafter Standard & Poor’s, High Yield Bond Primer] (noting that 
most high-yield bonds mature in seven to ten years) (last visited June 1, 2014).
113. See George G. Triantis, A Free-Cash-Flow Theory o f  Secured Debt and Creditor Priorities, 80 Va . L. 
Rev . 2155,2159 (1994) (describing the effect o f secured debt on management behavior).
114. See Standard & Poor’s, High Yield Bond Primer, supra note 112 (charting the increase in the share of 
secured high-yield bond issuances since 2005).
115. For a description of second-lien loans, see Standard & Poor’s, A Guide to the Loan Market, 
supra note 62, at 17-18.
116. See Standard & Poor’s, A Guide to the Loan Market, supra note 62, at 17 (noting that the 
interest-rate spread between second-lien and first-lien loans typically ranges from 200 to 1000 basis points). 
Another oft-noted difference between loans and bonds is that bond indentures are, in principle, enforced by a 
trustee on behalf of the noteholders. In practice, however, bond trustees do not engage in any independent 
monitoring of borrowers, and serve merely to administer the credit relationship and coordinate noteholder actions. 
See Steven L. Schwarcz & Gregory M. Sergi, Bond Defaults and the Dilemma o f  the Indenture Trustee, 59 Ala. 
L. Rev . 1037, 1044 (2008) (highlighting the largely ministerial role o f bond trustees).
2014] The Rise o f the Leveraged Loan Market 747





Leveraged Loans and High- 
Yield Bonds




institutional only (and mostly 
non-bank)




Covenants Tight Loose Intermediate
Credit
Protection
Secured Unsecured Leveraged loans: 
predominantly secured, with 
second-lien loans increasing
High-Yield bonds: 
predominantly unsecured, but 
secured bonds increasing in 
market share
C. Are Syndicated Loans Securities?
Notwithstanding their functional convergence with public bonds, corporate loans that 
are syndicated and traded continue to be treated as non-securities under U.S. law, thereby 
avoiding all disclosure requirements thereunder. In the public bond market, mandatory 
disclosure in practice means that the initial bond issuance must be offered to the public by 
means of a detailed registration statement that frequently runs in the hundreds of pages. 
Post-funding, the issuer may still be subject to ongoing disclosure requirements, even if it 
is a private company, so long as the bonds have at least 300 holders of record.117 Finally, 
the issuance is subject to various antifraud provisions of the Securities Acts including most 
significantly Rule 10b-5.118 The loan market avoids these entirely. Instead, leveraged loans 
tend to be marketed to investors with slim “bank books” containing a short term-sheet for 
the credit facility and management projections.119 The only additional disclosure 
requirements to which the borrower is subject are contractual ones—the covenants for 
which lenders negotiate in the credit agreement.120 But in light of the rise of syndicated
117. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (2012).
118. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013).
119. See Standard & Poor’s, A Guide to the Loan Market, supra note 62, at 9 (describing a bank 
book’s typical content).
120. Unlike shareholders, creditors are not owed fiduciary duties by directors or officers, unless the company 
becomes insolvent. See N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found. Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101-03 
(Del. 2007) (“[T]he creditors of an insolvent corporation have standing to maintain derivative claims against 
directors . . . .” (emphasis in the original)); Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ’ns, 621 A.2d 784, 787-88 (Del. Ch. 1992) 
(“[T]he general rule is that directors do not owe creditors duties beyond the relevant contractual terms absent
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lending and secondary trading of loans, is the regulatory distinction between loans and 
bonds defensible under the law?
1. The Reves Framework
The Securities Act’s remarkably expansive definition of a “security” includes any 
“note, . . . bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness,. . . investment contract,. . .  or any 
certificate of interest or participation in . . . any of the foregoing.” 121 The Securities Acts 
do not treat all promissory notes or debt instruments as securities, however. The foregoing 
definition’s laundry-list of instruments is subject to the equally expansive caveat “unless 
the context otherwise requires,” leaving to the courts the task of determining the 
definition’s actual contours.122
The judicial analysis of whether a particular debt instrument is a security proceeds in 
what is by now a well-established order. In Reves v. Ernst & Young,123 the Supreme Court 
adopted the Second Circuit’s “family resemblance” test, which begins with a presumption 
that every note is a security, in light of the all-encompassing Securities Act definition.124 
This presumption may be rebutted, however, if the note strongly resembles one of the 
families of instruments previously determined by the courts to be non-securities, all 
according to the following four factors:
(1) “[T]he motivations that would prompt a reasonable seller and buyer to enter into” 
the transaction;
(2) “[T]he ‘plan of distribution’ of the instrument;]”
(3) “[T]he reasonable expectations of the investing public[;]” and
(4) “[W]hether some factor such as the existence of another regulatory scheme 
significantly reduces the risk of the instrument, thereby rendering application of the 
Securities Acts unnecessary.” 125
If the note in question does not sufficiently resemble one of the families of non­
securities, the court must determine whether to create a new category of non-security, 
employing the same four-factor analysis.126 The note is deemed a security if it fails both 
tests. In addition to clarifying the analysis for debt instruments, the Reves Court reiterated 
the long-held view that traditional bank loans should not be subject to securities regulation,
special circumstances. . .  e.g., fraud, insolvency, or a violation of a statute___”) (internal quotes omitted); Credit
Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *1155-57 
(Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (holding that when facing insolvency, a board does not breach its fiduciary duties by 
placing the corporate enterprise interests before shareholders).
121. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(l) (2012) (providing the Securities Act o f 1933’s definition of a “security”). Note, 
however, that the definition of a “security” under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 does not include the words 
“evidence of indebtedness.” 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2012).
122. 15 U.S.C. § § 77b(a), 78c(a) (2012).
123. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 63 (1990), reh 'g denied, 494 U.S. 1092 (1990).
124. Id. at 63, 65.
125. Id. at 66-67.
126. Id. at 67.
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noting that “notes evidencing loans by commercial banks for current operations” are among 
the categories of non-securities.127
2. Banco Espanol
The question of whether syndicated loans in their current incarnation are securities 
has not yet come before the courts. The case that is thought to be authoritative on this 
question, Banco Espanol de Credito v. Security Pacific National Bank, 128 deals with their 
precursor—loan participations.129 Syndicated loans are traded on the secondary market by 
assignment, which transfers all of the rights and duties of the assignor lender to a new 
lender. In contrast to a loan assignment, a loan participation is merely a promise by an 
existing lender to distribute its share (or a portion of its share) of all principal and interest 
payments on the loan to a third party.130
At issue in Banco Espanol was a loan participation program in which Security Pacific, 
a nationally chartered bank, solicited various investors to purchase participations in 
unsecured, short-term loans that it had originated to a financial service company, Integrated 
Resources, Inc. When Integrated began defaulting on its loans, the purchasers of the loan 
participations, having no recourse against the borrower,131 sued Security Pacific for failing 
to disclose material facts about Integrated’s financial condition as required by Section 
12(2) of the Securities Act.132 The success of such a claim depended on a finding that the 
participations were, in fact, securities.
The first question the court tackled was how to treat the loan participation in relation 
to the loan itself for purposes of the securities laws. Here, the court noted with approval 
the district court’s conclusion that, while “a participation in an instrument might in some
127. Id. at 65 (quoting Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 939 (2d Cir. 1984), cert, 
denied, 469 U.S. 884 (1984)).
128. Banco Espanol de Credito v. Sec. Pac. Nat’l Bank, 973 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1992), cert, denied, 509 U.S. 
903 (1993).
129. Id. at 53. Loan participations became popular before the current practice of fully transferring loans by 
assignment. See Robert F. Komegay, Jr., Bank Loans as Securities: A Legal and Financial Economic Analysis o f  
the Treatment o f  Marketable Bank Assets under the Securities Acts, 40 UCLA L. Rev. 799, 825 (1993) (charting 
the rise of loan participations).
130. See Richard Wight et al., The LTSA’s Complete Credit Agreement Guide 507,507-08 (2009) 
(discussing the difference between assignments and participations). Loan participations were a convenient way 
of transferring the risk of loans off banks’ balance sheets without requiring them to actually assign the loans. The 
lender effectively acts as a pass-through, sending proceeds from the loan received from the borrower directly to 
the purchaser of the loan participation. Because the loan participant is not in contractual privity with the borrower, 
it generally has no voting rights under the loan agreement, no direct recourse to the borrower’s assets in the event 
of default, and no other traditional lender powers. Id. Most importantly from the perspective of the securities laws, 
perhaps, is the fact that the purchaser of the loan participation receives only the information that the lender 
contracts to share with it, which may be less than what the borrower is required to provide to the lender under the 
loan agreement. Id.
131. See id. (stating that the holder of a loan participation is not in contractual privity with the borrowing 
company).
132. Banco Espanol de Credito v. SEC Pac., Nat’l Bank, 763 F. Supp. 36, 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); see also ’33 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (2014).
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circumstances be considered a security even where the instrument itself is not[,]” 133 in this 
case the loan participation “did not have an identity separate from the underlying loan.” 134 
This conclusion alone is puzzling, given that the loan agreement was a contract between 
the borrower, Integrated, and the original lender, Security Pacific, while the participation 
was solely between Security Pacific and the purchasers, and had wholly different terms.135 
Specifically, the purchasers did not have the lenders’ rights under the loan agreement, and 
in particular did not have access to information about the borrower that other lenders 
did.136
In a relatively cursory opinion, a majority of the Second Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s judgment that the loan participations were not securities for purposes of the 
Securities Acts, concluding that the loan participations bore a “family resemblance” to 
loans by commercial banks to their customers for current operations, a well recognized 
category of non-securities.137 Specifically, the court agreed with the district court’s 
conclusions under the four-factor Reves test that: first, the parties’ primary motivation was 
commercial; second, the plan of distribution did not resemble that of securities because 
“only institutional and corporate entities were solicited” and resales were prohibited 
without Security Pacific’s consent; third, the investing public would reasonably have 
perceived that these were participations in loans rather than investments; and fourth, 
another regulatory scheme mitigated the need for securities regulation, because the Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) had issued policy guidelines for the sale of 
loan participations.138
In a strong dissent, the Chief Judge agreed with the SEC’s amicus brief that the loan 
participations were securities because they differed from traditional loan participations in 
at least four key respects: (1) the nature and number of the purchasers, (2) the purchasers’ 
purpose, (3) the marketing of the loan participations, and (4) the information made
133. Banco Espanol, 973 F.2d at 54 (citing Banco Espanol de Credito v. Sec. Pac. Nat’l Bank, 763 F. Supp. 
36,41 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)).
134. Id. (citing Banco Espanol, 763 F. Supp. 36,42 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)).
135. Banco Espanol de Credito v. Sec. Pac. Nat’l Bank, 763 F. Supp. 36, 37-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
136. Id. at 38.
137. Banco Espanol, 973 F.2d at 55-56.
138. Id. at 54. Surprisingly, the court did not address whether the loan participations were securities in the 
form of “investment contracts,” the analysis for which is set forth in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). 
Pre-Reves cases had rejected arguments that loan participations or syndications were “investment contracts,” on 
the theory that interest on a loan is not the type of “profit” associated with an investment purpose. See McVay v. 
W. Plains Serv. Corp., 823 F.2d 1395, 1400 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that a participant in a loan agreement held 
no interest in loan funds, the note, or mortgages other than “bare legal title”). But in SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 
389 (2004), the Supreme Court cast doubt on the continued validity of these cases, by holding that for purposes 
of the investment contract test, “profits” does not require something akin to an equity interest; a fixed interest 
(such as interest on a loan) may suffice. See Edwards, 540 U.S. at 897-99 (holding that contract yielding a fixed 
rate of return can be a security). The Reves test was intended to supplant more ffee-form analyses such as the 
Howey test for “investment contracts” in the specific case of debt instruments. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 64 (rejecting 
other courts’ application of the Howey test to notes). Yet the Howey lineage of cases strongly informed Reves, 
and is still thought to constitute an additional test that a debt instrument must fail before it can be conclusively 
ruled a non-security. In fact, Fox v. Dream Trust, 743 F. Supp. 2d 389,398 (2d Cir. 2010) states that certain loan 
participations may potentially constitute notes that are securities and investment contracts. See Fox, 743 F. Supp. 
2d at 398 (finding that the participation agreement at issue was a security and an investment contract).
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available to the purchasers.139 First, although some banks purchased the loan 
participations, there were also many “non-financial entities” seeking to make an 
investment.140 Second, a sales desk at Security Pacific within its trading department (rather 
than its commercial loan department) ran the loan participation program.141 Third, 
promotional materials portrayed the loan participations as competitive with commercial 
paper (which is undeniably a security), referred to the purchasers as “investors,” and 
emphasized the ability to trade the loan notes.142 Finally, the purchasers did not receive 
any nonpublic information about the borrowers at issue, thereby sharply distinguishing 
them from commercial lenders and placing them in a significantly less well-informed 
position than the original lender, Security Pacific.143
The majority opinion is indeed misleading in describing the loan participation 
program as a small number of private, fully negotiated arrangements between Security 
Pacific and a select group of purchasers regarding a specific commercial loan. Security 
Pacific’s loan notes program was far broader than the loan participations at issue in this 
case: it covered 100-250 borrowers and involved 600-700 investors at the time.144 
Moreover, purchasers did not approach Security Pacific with respect to Integrated’s loan 
specifically; rather, the trading desk at Security Pacific would solicit investors through 
daily calls (some of which were “cold calls”) regarding any number of different loans.145
If the majority opinion holds on even these facts, the ruling is broad indeed and 
exempts a large swath of trading programs related to instruments formally designated as 
loans. While subsequent cases have interpreted Banco Espanol narrowly,146 it has not been 
overturned and is widely considered to apply to both loan participations and syndicated 
loan assignments.147 Yet, the court decided Banco Espanol in 1992, at a time when the 
syndicated loan market was on the cusp of its rapid expansion, and had not reached 
anywhere near its current level of depth and liquidity. While there is a strong case to be 
made that Banco Espanol was wrongly decided at the time, we are still left with the 
question of whether it is good law in light of the interim changes to the loan market. In 
particular, how do syndicated loans fare today under a Reves analysis?
139. Banco Espanol, 973 F.2d at 56 (Oakes, C.J., dissenting).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 57.
142. Id  at 58.
143. Id
144. Banco Espanol, 973 F.2d at 58 (Oakes, C.J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 57.
146. See Pollack v. Laidlaw Holdings, Inc., 27 F.3d 808, 815 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding, on a limited set of 
facts, that passive investors in a participation agreement were protected by federal securities laws). Decided only 
a year after Banco Espanol, the Second Circuit’s Pollack decision concluded that unsecured mortgage 
participations marketed to passive individual investors were securities under the Securities Acts. Id. Oddly, the 
court did not overturn Banco Espanol, despite upending its key underpinnings. Infra Part IV.C.3.
147. See generally Syndicated Loans as Securities, Proskauer Rose LLP (2011), available at 
http://www.proskauer.com/files/uploads/broker-dealer/Syndicated-Loans-as-Securities.pdf (discussing the 
framework for determining whether syndicated loans are securities and including a discussion of Banco Espanol).
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3. Reves Applied to Syndicated Loans
We begin by applying the four Reves factors to syndicated loans.148
The first Reves factor looks to whether the parties’ motivations were investment 
(which would weigh in favor of treatment as a security) versus commercial or consumer 
(which would weigh in favor of treatment as a non-security).149 The Banco Espanol 
majority made much of the fact that Security Pacific was primarily in the business of 
making commercial loans, but only a year later, the court acknowledged that the primary 
focus should be on the motivation of the purchaser of the instrument.150 Specifically, a 
buyer’s investment motivation trumps a seller’s commercial motivation.151
Purchasers in the leveraged loan market regularly describe themselves as investors, 
rather than as lenders.152 Aside from the lead arranger, members of the syndicate generally 
have no relationship or even contact with the borrower, and they do not view their efforts 
or input as affecting the borrower’s success.153 In the leveraged loan space, their 
expectation is clearly to be able to trade their loan holdings on a liquid market.154 All of 
these bespeak an investment, rather than commercial, objective. Turning to the borrower, 
in a leveraged loan transaction, the borrowing company is rarely seeking funds for current 
operations. Instead, banks fill such needs via revolving lines of credit.155 Leveraged loans 
are typically used for shareholder-specific reasons (such as to issue dividends to 
shareholders) or to make new investments (such as acquisitions).156 Finally, although lead
148. As a preliminary matter, it is worth distinguishing broadly between two types of syndicated loans: the 
revolving loan and the term loan. Revolving loans are borrowings under a line o f credit that is kept open for the 
company for a defined period, and which may be borrowed, repaid, and re-borrowed up to the credit limit at any 
time. See Standard & Poor’s, A Guide to the Loan Market, supra note 62, at 16. Such lines o f credit are 
typically used for short-term operational needs. Id. at 7. Term loans, in contrast, are typically multi-year loans 
that are borrowed entirely upfront only once and repaid only at maturity. Id. at 16 (noting that term loans generally 
involve a series o f repayments or a single lump sum repayment). Syndicated revolving loans continue to be funded 
exclusively by banks, which have the capacity to keep such lines of credit open at very low interest rates, and are 
significantly less risky than term loans. Id. at 10 (noting that banks generally provide unfunded revolving credits). 
Thus, though they are syndicated, revolving loans still resemble the archetypal bank loan in many respects, thus 
arguing for their treatment as non-securities. In contrast, syndicated term loans have experienced the most 
dramatic change, as they are now funded primarily by non-banks and involve greater levels of risk and less 
monitoring and creditor protection. See supra Part [V.B (describing changes to the syndicated loan market). Thus, 
for the remainder of this discussion, “syndicated loans” will refer exclusively to syndicated term loans, for which 
the treatment as non-securities is the weakest.
149. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 63-65 (1990) (discussing the “investment v. commercial” test 
and noting its similarity to the “family resemblance” test which was adopted).
150. Pollack v. Laidlaw Holdings, Inc., 27 F.3d 808, 812-13 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that the buyer 
appellant’s motivation to invest indicated the note was a security despite the sellers motivation).
151. Id.
152. See Standard & Poor’s, A Guide to the Loan Market, supra note 62, at 10 (describing the various 
participants in the “loan investor market”).
153. See Simons, supra note 73, at 46 (describing the lead arranger as an intermediary between the borrower 
and the rest of the syndicate).
154. See Standard & Poor’s, A Guide to the Loan Market, supra note 62, at 15 (describing the role 
played by liquidity in loan pricing).
155. See supra note 148.
156. See Fox v. Dream Trust, 743 F. Supp. 2d 389, 399 (2010) (noting that these features point towards an 
investment motivation).
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arranger positions continue to be filled by large investment or commercial banks, their role 
in such capacity is not to fund companies’ operations. Lead arrangers are in the business 
of collecting fees for performing what is effectively an underwriting function, and should 
therefore not be viewed as lenders. 157
The second Reves factor, the plan of distribution, considers the manner in which a 
debt instrument is marketed and sold, and to whom. Whereas traditional bank loans are 
private, bilateral, long-term agreements between a single company and its relationship 
bank, syndicated loans are distributed much like public securities. First, the number of 
creditors can be very large, whether at the initial syndication or through subsequent trading 
and securitization. Second, they are marketed widely by the lead arranger’s syndication 
desk, rather than the commercial lending desk. 158 The loan’s origination is thus divorced 
from the loan’s distribution. The purchasers of leveraged loans are primarily non-banks— 
that is, institutions unable to closely monitor borrowers and with very different 
objectives. 159 CLOs, the primary purchasers of leveraged loans, exist solely to hold 
investments. 160 All of these weigh heavily in favor of treatment as securities.
Only two features leveraged loan distribution differ from a classic public distribution 
of securities. First, although trading in the leveraged loan market is heavy (and in fact 
heavier than for high-yield bonds), it is still the case that the borrower’s consent is typically 
required for any assignment of the loan. 161 Flowever, credit agreements for leveraged loans 
routinely provide that the borrower may not unreasonably withhold consent, and if the 
borrower fails to respond to a request for consent within a specified number of days, it is 
deemed to have acquiesced to the assignment. 162 Second, leveraged loans are marketed 
only to institutional investors, and never to direct retail investors. 163 Yet the Reves Court 
confirmed that offerings to sophisticated parties may nonetheless amount to public 
distribution. 164 Indeed, direct retail investors are absent from the high-yield bond market 
as well, and high-yield bonds very clearly continue to be regulated as securities.
Under the third Reves factor, an instrument may be characterized as a security 
notwithstanding its underlying economics if the “reasonable perception of the instrument 
by the investing public” is that of an investment. 165 Because leveraged loans are explicitly 
marketed as investments, the purchasers of such loans describe themselves as investors, 
and they are risky commitments of capital for at least several years, it would be difficult to
157. Victoria Ivashina & Anna Kovner, The Private Equity Advantage: Leveraged Buyout Firms and 
Relationship Banking, 24 REV. Fin. STUD. 2462,2464 (2011) (noting the appeal of fee income for lead arrangers).
158. See Wilmarth, supra note 16, at 379 (“The growing importance of institutional investors has caused 
lead banks to price and market their syndicated loans in a manner similar to corporate bonds.”).
159. See Yago & McCarthy, supra note 83, at 26-27 (discussing how initially banks dominated the 
secondary market for syndicated loans but as the market developed, nonbanks are now the main participants).
160. See Richard W. Stewart, Collateralized Loan Obligations: A Primer, in The HANDBOOK OF Loan 
Syndications and Trading 646, 646-47 (Allison Taylor & Alicia Sansone eds., 2007) (describing a CLO as 
“a special-purposes investment vehicle (SPV) established to accumulate a diversified pool of loans”).
161. See WIGHT ET AL., supra note 130 (outlining lender consent rights).
162. Id.
163. See Fox v. Dream Trust, 743 F. Supp. 2d 389, 398 (2010) (noting that distribution of a note to retail 
investors weighs in favor of its treatment as a security).
164. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 68 (1990).
165. Banco Espanol de Credito v. Sec. Pac. Nat’l Bank, 973 F.2d 51, 55 (2d Cir. 1992).
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characterize them as anything other than investments. On the other hand, it is also clear 
that, as institutional investors, loan purchasers should be well aware that loans are not 
currently regulated as securities. This Reves factor’s framing thus suffers from a circularity 
problem. Should the fact that investors are aware that leveraged loans are treated as non­
securities imply that they can never be regulated as securities? That result seems 
implausible.
The fourth Reves factor considers whether the debt instrument contains or is subject 
to some risk-reducing factor. Riskier financial instruments are, generally speaking, more 
likely to call for the protection of the securities laws, and thus risk-reducing features weigh 
against treatment as a security under Reves. The Banco Espanol court relied on the OCC’s 
oversight of national banks to find this fourth factor satisfied with respect to loan 
participations. The court’s conclusion on this factor is puzzling, given that many of the 
purchasers of the loan participations were non-banks.166 Moreover, for purposes of the 
fourth Reves factor, it is not sufficient simply to point to the existence of another regulatory 
scheme; such regulation must in some way reduce the risk of the instrument for the 
purchaser.167
The fact that most leveraged loans are secured by the assets of the borrowing company 
is thus a more plausible risk-reducing factor than the OCC’s bank oversight.168 Yet secured 
bonds, which are increasingly common, remain securities, notwithstanding the existence 
of collateral protection. Conversely, many leveraged loans are unsecured or second-lien, 
and thus far neither the courts nor the SEC have treated such instruments as securities.
Thus, each of the four Reves factors weighs in favor of treating syndicated loans as 
securities. This is particularly so for leveraged loans. The Reves analysis suggests that 
leveraged loans, which are widely traded, highly risky investments, fit very poorly within 
the commercial loan framework that has until now justified their treatment as non­
securities.169
More generally, the Reves analysis of leveraged loans uncovers a key flaw in the 
family resemblance test: gauging whether a debt instrument is analogous to a particular
166. For a critique of the Banco Espanol court’s reliance on the OCC regulatory scheme, see Louisa C. 
Crampton, Originating Lender Bank Liability to Participants in the B-Tranche o f  a Leveraged Loan: Mending 
the Gap Between Federal Banking and Federal Securities Regulation, 1 N.C. BANKING INST. 255,283-86 (1997), 
stating that while the Banco Espanol court considered the OCC’s Banking Circular 181 to be “an adequate 
substitute for the federal securities laws” it did not further examine the guidelines “to ensure that they would 
provide participants with protections against nondisclosure, fraud, or misrepresentation by the originating bank”; 
Komegay, supra note 129, at 848 (arguing that the relevant OCC guidelines did not protect investors in loan 
participations).
167. See Richard Y. Roberts & Randall W. Quinn, Leveling the Playing Field: The Need fo r  Investor 
Protection fo r  Bank Sales o f  Loan Participations, 63 F o r d h a m  L. Rev . 2115, 2117 (1995) (asserting that 
“purchasers of loan participations that function as investments should be protected by the federal securities laws”).
168. See Fox, 743 F. Supp. 2d at 400 (citing Bass v. Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc., 210 F.3d577, 585 (6th 
Cir. 2000)) (explaining that the fourth Reves factor “calls for examination of other risk-reducing factors, such as 
collateralization”).
169. As discussed, that loans are regulated differently from securities stems from their history as bilateral, 
illiquid commercial arrangements. In this regard, the odd regulatory status quo of syndicated loans is similar to 
that o f derivatives, which historically were not regulated as securities simply due to their origins in the 
commodities realm. See Roberta Romano, The Political Dynamics o f  Derivative Securities Regulation 14 Y a l e  
J. o n  R e g . 279(1997).
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family of instruments deemed non-securities becomes a meaningless exercise when the 
underlying archetypes for each family are themselves rapidly changing. Indeed, the Banco 
Espanol court sought to determine whether the loan participations at issue were analogous 
to commercial loans, yet failed to acknowledge that the paradigm of commercial lending 
was itself in flux.170
4. Regulatory Stickiness
If leveraged loans and high-yield bonds are now virtually interchangeable, and if a 
correct application of the case law would conclude that leveraged loans are securities, 
where are the calls to treat them accordingly? Treating like cases alike is a fundamental 
principle of the legal system in a liberal democracy,171 regardless of whether it is achieved 
or even achievable in practice. More mundanely, the persistence of the regulatory 
distinction between leveraged loans and high-yield bonds now borders on the absurd. Why 
then are the major regulatory and market players silent on this issue?
One likely explanation is that the SEC has bigger fish to fry. After the Second Circuit 
dealt it a loss in Banco Espanol, the SEC apparently decided to take a wait-and-see 
approach with respect to syndicated loans. And in the meantime, the securities markets 
were rocked by successive large-scale scandals such as Enron, the executive compensation 
and earnings management accounting scandals of the early 2000s, the dot-com bubble 
bursting, the Madoff Ponzi scheme, and the mortgage-backed securities and credit default 
swap implosions. By contrast, the leveraged loan market has hummed along relatively 
smoothly.172 Though issuance volume and trading surged over the last decade—an 
obvious trigger for regulatory attention—the leveraged loan market has yet to experience 
the major upheavals or scandals that would force the SEC’s hand by drawing the public’s 
attention. The leveraged loan market is at once the most dynamic and the least visible 
capital market in the U.S., which is exactly how its participants like it.
Of course, the financial crisis hardly left the syndicated loan market unscathed. The 
largest U.S. banks had committed to funding billions in leveraged loans just before the 
credit crisis began, and were unable to offload the commitments, triggering massive and 
immediate losses on their balance sheets.173 Yet the credit crunch in the leveraged loan 
market failed to trigger the public ire for two reasons.
First, the significantly larger losses from mortgage-backed securities and credit 
default swaps made these better targets for a Wall Street backlash than syndicated lending. 
Second, unlike the subprime mortgage blowup, which affected seemingly everyone from 
the largest financial institutions down to the American consumer, the leveraged loan crisis 
was relatively well contained to the financial players involved in purchasing leveraged
170. For a different critique of Reves in this context, see Crampton, supra note 166, at 271 n.122 and 
accompanying text, explaining that the Reves court “acknowledged this lack of predictability”.
171. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 227 (1977) (identifying the right to equal 
treatment, which is defined as “the right to an equal distribution of some opportunity or resource or burden”).
172. See Amar Gande & Anthony Saunders, Are Banks Still Special When There Is a Secondary Market for 
Loans?, 67 J. FIN. 1649, 1650 (2012) (noting that the trading volume for syndicated loans declined only slightly 
during the recent financial crisis, as compared to the crashes in structured finance).
173. Wilmarth, supra note 79, at 971.
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loans. When the crisis hit, commentators immediately predicted a rash of bankruptcies by 
over-leveraged companies, particularly private equity-owned ones, which, it was said, had 
pushed the envelope of easy credit too far. But as of 2014 we are still waiting for the other 
shoe to drop. While below-investment grade issuers did experience increased defaults post­
crisis, the effects did not nearly trickle down to corporate America and consumers to the 
extent predicted.174
Moreover, to the extent that observers were concerned by over-lending in the 
leveraged loan market, the blame was placed on the folly of investors, rather than on 
issuers’ fraudulent behavior. There were no real allegations that leveraged issuers had 
misstated their financials or otherwise misled creditors or provided insufficient disclosure; 
high-yield investors simply made a bad bet. Imposing new disclosure requirements on 
issuers of leveraged loans would thus have been an odd solution.175 Finally, and perhaps 
most significantly for purposes of this Article, to the extent that the leveraged loan market 
suffered harm, the high-yield bond market suffered even more.176 It would be difficult to 
point to securities regulation as the solution to problems in the leveraged loan market when 
an equivalent regulated market experienced the very same problems.
A second possibility is that the SEC is incentivized to remain hands-off with respect 
to private markets (such as the corporate loan markets), even as they expand and thrive, 
while tightly regulating the already-existing public markets.177 Zachary Gubler argues that 
the SEC has strong incentives not to regulate private capital markets, notwithstanding their 
dramatic expansion and relatively anemic activity in the public markets (particularly the 
market for IPOs).178 This is so, he argues, because the SEC employees’ private incentives 
are not best served by forever expanding the SEC’s regulatory reach. Rather, the SEC 
employees may be better off allowing vast, unregulated private markets to develop, in order
174. First, the defaults were very frequently resolved as voluntary workouts among creditors (particularly 
when the borrower was private-equity-owned), avoiding the upheavals of bankruptcy and the finality of 
liquidation. See Ernst & Young, Private Equity Buys Time with Major Refinancings, Knowledge@Wharton 
at 4 (Apr. 24, 2012), https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/emst-young-private-equity-buys-time-with- 
major-refinancings/. Second, many leveraged issuers took advantage of a temporary credit easing in the high- 
yield bond market in late 2010 to refinance their leveraged loans as high-yield bonds (pointing once again to the 
fluidity between, and interchangeable nature of, the two markets) and extend the maturities on their debt. Id. As 
a result, the American public did not experience the trauma of a major wave of corporate bankruptcies resulting 
from pressure in the leveraged loan market.
175. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge o f Fashioning Relevant 
Reforms, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 301, 329 (2004) (noting that during periods of irrational investor behavior such as 
market bubbles, investors tend to ignore or discount correct information that would dampen their exuberance). In 
recent years, the key regulatory concern in the corporate loan and bond markets has not been issuers abusing 
investors, but systemic effects from overly permissive lending by depositary banks or other large financial 
institutions. I suspect that there is broad agreement that this problem is best addressed by regulating lending 
institutions themselves (for example, through strict minimum capital requirements for banks), rather than through 
new regulation of all assets in which lending institutions might possibly invest.
176. See Sansone et al., supra note 15, at 4 (noting a higher default rate for high-yield bonds than for 
leveraged loans on average).
177. See generally Zachary J. Gubler, Public Choice Theory and the Private Securities Market 91 N C L 
Rev. 745 (2013).
178. See id. (discussing the smaller number of interest groups affected in the private markets compared to 
public markets).
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to keep special interest groups happy and maximize their future job opportunities. 
Simultaneously, to reassure the general public that they are acting diligently, they will 
impose tight regulation in the markets that are already public. If correct, Gubler’s 
hypothesis would explain the observed pattern of regulatory laissez-faire with respect to 
leveraged loans.
A final intriguing explanation for the continued discrepancy in the regulation of loans 
and bonds is the one proffered in Part V of this Article, namely that the relevant actors all 
recognize that, in practice, applying securities regulation simply would not make much of 
a difference. At base, the current situation is one in which the regulatory treatment is 
determined simply by whether the borrower and investors choose to refer to the instrument 
as a “loan” or a “bond.” In effect, loan market participants are making the fact of non­
regulation a self-fulfilling prophecy by deliberately keeping their eyes shut to the absurdity 
of this dichotomy. 179 They are gambling that the courts and regulators will not upset 
current practice with trillions of dollars at stake. 180
Putting aside the regulatory inertia, in an ideal world, what ought to be done about the 
specious distinction between leveraged loans and high-yield bonds? An obvious solution 
is to begin regulating leveraged loans as securities, and subject them to the same mandatory 
disclosure and other securities rules as high-yield bonds. This, I have argued, would be the 
doctrinally correct answer. Yet, the next Part demonstrates that mandatory disclosure is 
ineffective in the high-yield bond market, making it inadvisable as a policy choice.
V . T h e  D e b t -M a r k e t  N a t u r a l  E x p e r im e n t  
A. Natural Experiment
Part II of this Article detailed the difficulties involved in testing whether mandatory 
disclosure is effective. While we are unlikely ever to answer the question of whether 
securities regulation is effective generally—for all times and all market actors—we may 
still draw lessons from developments in the financial markets and continued testing. One 
option is to watch opportunistically for special market conditions that approach the 
randomized trial ideal. The convergence of the leveraged loan market and the high-yield 
bond market presents precisely such a situation: for the first time, we have a pair of virtually 
identical debt markets—with the same issuers, investors, pricing, and terms—and only one 
of which is regulated as a securities market.
Much can be salvaged from this natural experiment, notwithstanding the obstacles to 
a true empirical test. The trick is to return to the goals of mandatory disclosure in securities 
regulation. If we take the SEC at its word that it acts in the public interest, and thereby rule 
out special-interest goals, we find that the various public-interest goals of mandatory
179. The definitive reference on the development and mechanics of syndicated loans begins with the 
following admonition: “LOANS ARE NOT SECURITIES!” Allison Taylor & Alicia Sansone, Preface to The 
Handbook of Loan Syndications and Trading xv, xvi (Allison Taylor & Alicia Sansone eds., 2007). The 
emphasis strongly suggests that this statement is not merely descriptive, but precatory.
180. Cf. Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 14, at 385 (describing generally how market participants 
rapidly exploit regulatory voids, notwithstanding the legal risks, because doing so gives them significantly greater 
political and estoppel grounds to resist an unfavorable regulatory change).
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disclosure noted in Part II.B fall into two broad categories: (1) protecting unsophisticated 
investors, and (2) correcting inefficiencies in the production, dissemination, and 
verification of investment information.181
To clarify the second goal, securities-law scholars generally agree that in the absence 
of mandatory disclosure, it is at least conceivable that the amount of credible, material 
information available to investors would be suboptimal.182 Why might financial markets, 
left to their own devices, generate too little credible information or distribute it 
inefficiently? Although material information about issuers is clearly valuable to investors, 
they may not be willing to pay for such information to be produced and verified: due to the 
difficulties of coordinating as a group and the ability to ffee-ride on others’ efforts, they 
will underinvest in information.183 Conversely, by duplicating some of each other’s efforts 
in the absence of public disclosure, investors and analysts may simultaneously overinvest 
in information.184 Imposing disclosure requirements on issuers could mitigate these 
inefficiencies in the market for investment information. Through detailed requirements as 
to the content, timing, and format of corporate disclosures, backed up by robust antifraud 
liability, mandatory disclosure could correct both the underproduction of accurate 
investment information and the overproduction of false or misleading investment 
information that would occur in an unregulated market.185
This hypothesis has testable implications. If investors are rational, they will reward 
markets subject to mandatory disclosure with more investment.186 So long as it is not 
excessively costly, the imposition o f  mandatory disclosure should result in an increase in 
a given market’s amount o f investment. By effectively subsidizing the production and 
dissemination of reliable information, and punishing the production of false or misleading 
information, mandatory disclosure should push the amount of investment closer to the 
optimal equilibrium.
181. See, e.g., Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. Corp. 
L. 1, 9 (1983) (discussing five principal arguments to justify the SEC’s mandatory corporate disclosure system); 
Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 14, at 372.
182. Explanations for why issuers might produce less information than is socially optimal center on free­
riding and collective action problems among investors and analysts, as well as the third-party externalities 
associated with disclosure. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 23, at 731-34 (arguing that mandatory investment can 
prevent over and under-investment in securities research by analysts); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 1, at 
686 (acknowledging that firms might under-disclose in the absence of regulation because disclosure by one firm 
benefits investors in other firms, as well as non-shareholder constituencies); Zohar Goshen & Gideon 
Parchomovsky, The Essential Role o f Securities Regulation, 55 Duke L.J. 711, 755-66 (2006) (arguing in favor 
of mandatory disclosure as reducing information traders’ search costs, and therefore increasing market 
efficiency). The basis for all of these arguments is the notion that information is a public good. Fox, supra note 
29, at 1393—95; Dale Arthur Oesterle, The Inexorable March Toward a Continuous Disclosure Requirement for 
Publicly Traded Corporations: "Are We There Yet? "20 Cardozo L. Rev. 135, 198-201 (1998).
183. See supra note 182 (detailing the various explanations for why investors might underinvest in 
information).
184. See Coffee, supra note 23, at 731-34 (arguing that mandatory investment can prevent both over and 
under-investment in securities research by analysts).
185. See generally supra note 10 (discussing that one the goals of mandatory disclosure is to remedy the 
underproduction of material investment information).
186. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 1, at 673 (“A world with fraud, or without adequate truthful 
information, is a world with too little investment. . . . ”).
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In testing this hypothesis, we face the problem that the first goal of mandatory 
disclosure, protecting unsophisticated investors, may have precisely the opposite effect on 
investment. For example, regulatory efforts to prevent unsophisticated investors from 
taking on too much risk might take the form of actively discouraging or even prohibiting 
them from investing, resulting in less investment overall in that particular market. Yet, in 
the corporate debt markets our task is immensely simplified, as direct retail investors are 
effectively absent from both the leveraged loan and high-yield bond markets. 187 The first 
goal of mandatory disclosure can be safely ignored, clearing away much of the complexity 
on both the benefit and cost sides of the regulatory equation. With retail investors out of 
the picture, we are left with only the second goal: remedying inefficiencies that suppress 
the production of accurate investment information by issuers. This allows us to employ the 
level of investment in a given market as a rough proxy for the effectiveness of securities 
regulation: mandatory disclosure should drive up investment in that market; its absence 
should spur a decline in investment.
Assume for the time being that the leveraged loan and high-yield bond markets are 
perfectly identical as a functional matter, save for their regulation. 188 If mandatory 
disclosure were truly achieving its goal in the high-yield bond market, then investors (and 
therefore issuers) should prefer it to the leveraged loan market. Stated differently, if 
mandatory disclosure is indeed effective at solving investors’ free-riding and collective 
action problems, it should be in the joint best interests of investors and issuers to subject 
firms to it. Investors and issuers should flock to the regulated market and shun the 
unregulated market, such that we would observe all of the volume and liquidity in the high- 
yield bond market.
Yet, instead the leveraged loan market has flourished and now exhibits greater volume 
and liquidity than its regulated counterpart. 189 Under the orthodoxy of mandatory 
disclosure, a liquid leveraged loan market ought not to exist. This fact alone therefore poses 
a significant problem for the current regulatory regime: it is not achieving its only plausible 
goal.
B. How We Got Here and What to Do About It
Unfortunately, our work is not yet done. The conclusion that mandatory disclosure is 
ineffective does not on its own reveal the right policy response because we are left with a 
puzzle: how is it that the leveraged loan and high-yield bond markets continue to exist side- 
by-side? Under our simple thought experiment above, if mandatory disclosure were 
effective, there would be no leveraged loan market. Yet, if mandatory disclosure is indeed 
ineffective, as I have argued, there should be no high-yield bond market.
We therefore have a puzzle in two parts. First, just why is it that mandatory disclosure 
might be proving ineffective? How can we explain the dizzying growth of the leveraged 
loan market in the absence of securities regulation? Why would investors ever favor an 
equivalent market to high-yield bonds providing less disclosure? Second, if mandatory 
disclosure is indeed ineffective, how can we explain the continued existence of the high-
187. See Evans, supra note 88, at 1105 (stating that retail investors owned less than 30% of U.S. 
corporations’ stock in 2009).
188. This assumption will be relaxed in Part V.B.2 infra.
189. See supra note 13 (stating that the leveraged loan market reached $664 million in issuances in 2012).
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yield bond market? Why wouldn’t issuers and investors avoid the costs of ineffective 
regulation in the high-yield market and deal exclusively in leveraged loans? Only by 
answering these questions can we determine the appropriate regulatory course of action.
1. Why the Leveraged Loan Market?
If mandatory disclosure is indeed ineffective in the debt markets, and leveraged loans 
have thrived accordingly, there would seem to be two plausible explanations. One 
possibility is that the information failures that may originally have justified its imposition 
no longer exist or have been sufficiently mitigated through non-regulatory mechanisms. 
Indeed, how could there be a liquid leveraged loan market in the absence of mandated 
disclosure? What has prompted non-bank investors to purchase loans so willingly, despite 
declining covenant protection and monitoring? Why were loans entirely illiquid just over 
30 years ago—precisely due to the difficulty of transferring information about the issuer to 
another creditor—when today they are heavily traded?
It must be that loan investors are relying on new sources of information or 
mechanisms for disseminating it, obtained solely through private ordering. As discussed in 
Part IV.A, deregulation of the banking industry and capital requirements favoring 
diversification prompted strong demand for tradable loans. And once the demand was 
there, institutional structures quickly arose to satisfy it, including by getting material 
information out to investors. The Loan Syndications and Trading Association, a private 
trade association for lenders, was created and prompted a slew of changes making possible 
the widespread syndication and secondary trading of loans.190 These included drafting 
standardized loan assignment forms (similar in function to the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association forms for derivatives) and credit agreement provisions, facilitating 
mark-to-market pricing, and creating a pricing index for loans. All of these either conveyed 
previously unavailable information about loan issuers to investors or facilitated the rapid 
dissemination of existing information.191
As the market developed, the credit rating agencies began rating syndicated loans,192 
Committee on Uniform Securities Identification Procedures (CUSIPs) were added to credit 
facilities, the financial press began covering leveraged loans, and specialized databases 
began compiling loan pricing and terms that were formerly entirely private.193 It turns out 
that dispersed lenders can obtain valuable information about borrowers and credit facilities 
from a wide range of sources, even when the borrower is a private company.194 While the
190. See Allison A. Taylor, The LSTA and its Role in the Promotion o f the Corporate Loan Asset Class, in 
The Handbook of Loan Syndications and Trading 61,61-75 (Allison Taylor & Alicia Sansone eds., 2007) 
(discussing the Loan Syndications and Trading Association’s history, an overview of its significant 
accomplishments, and analysis of its impact on the development of that asset class during the 1990s and 2000s).
191. Even in imperfectly efficient markets, prices incorporate all manner of investment-relevant information. 
See Whitehead, supra note 58, at 667—70 (describing how the pricing of private debt may convey private 
information held by banks to other investors).
192. Standard & Poor’s, A Guide to the Loan Market, supra note 62, at 11.
193. The continued standardization of U.S. accounting principles has also undoubtedly favored lenders, as 
lenders can delegate monitoring to audit firms by requiring borrowers to have their financials audited.
194. The success of the loan market is particularly surprising in light of the fact that there is no true exchange 
or other single private institution that oversees or directs disclosure and other practices in the markets. The Loan
2014] The Rise o f the Leveraged Loan Market 761
credit rating agencies’ failures are legion, 195 the rating agencies clearly perform better 
when rating traditional corporate debt instruments (such as loans and bonds) than complex 
mortgage-backed securities and the related structured asset products for which they were 
notorious during the financial crisis. 196 Through their (albeit imperfect) gatekeeping 
function, the credit rating agencies convey to the wider loan investor community 
substantial private information obtained during their ratings process.
Finally, it may be that the lead arranger197 of a leveraged loan financing acts as a 
“reputational intermediary” 198 between issuers and loan investors. When a lead arranger 
retains some portion of a loan on its books, rather than syndicating the entire loan, it 
certifies to some degree the issuer’s creditworthiness to the rest of the syndicate. 199 If so, 
the lead arranger mitigates to some degree the relative dearth of publicly available 
information. Through any or all of these mechanisms, private ordering in the leveraged 
loan market appears to be substituting for the types of information that the securities laws 
require issuers to disclose publicly.
A different possibility for why mandatory disclosure is proving ineffective and the 
leveraged loan market has prospered is that, while information production may indeed be 
suboptimal in unregulated debt markets, mandatory disclosure is a poor solution to the 
problem. Because we have no ready means of determining what optimal disclosure might
Syndications and Trading Association (LSTA), the trade association for loan market participants, performs many 
useful coordinating functions in the loan market, but does not impose mandatory terms or disclosure. See Taylor, 
supra note 190, at 61 (describing the LSTA as “promoting] cooperation and coordination between the firms 
transacting in loans” through a “consensus-building process”). This is in contrast to the public securities markets, 
in which private institutions such as the securities exchanges exercise a quasi-regulatory function. See Paul G. 
Mahoney, The Exchange As Regulator, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1453, 1457-58 (1997) (describing incentives for private 
institutions to regulate the securities market). Many vocal critics of regulatory overreach in the securities markets 
argue that the exchanges already provide adequate oversight: in other words, we need not fear deregulation if 
there is an alternative institution that can coordinate and direct the market. Id. at 1459.
195. See, e.g., John Patrick Hunt, Credit Rating Agencies and the "Worldwide Credit Crisis": The Limits o f 
Reputation, the Insufficiency o f Reform, and a Proposal for Improvement, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. Rev. 109, 113 
(2009) (noting the inherent conflicts of interest involved in the ratings process, given that the rating agencies are 
paid by the issuers being rated); Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert o f Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down 
for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 Wash. U. L. Q. 619, 648^49 (1999) (noting the lack of competition among 
rating agencies); Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other Gatekeepers, in 
Financial Gatekeepers: Can They Protect Investors? 59, 64 (Yasuyuki Fuchita & Robert E. Litan eds., 
2006) (arguing that rating agencies are encouraged even by investors to provide overly optimistic ratings).
196. See Elisabeth de Fontenay, Private Equity Firms as Gatekeepers, 33 Rev. Banking & Fin. L. 115, 
177-78 (2013) (explaining why the credit rating agencies performed especially poorly in rating structured asset 
products during the financial crisis).
197. See Taylor & Yang, supra note 80 and accompanying text (explaining the function of lead arrangers of 
syndicated loans).
198. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 29, at 618.
199. See generally Amir Sufi, Information Asymmetry and Financing Arrangements: Evidence from 
Syndicated Loans, 62 J. FIN. 629 (2007) (finding that lead arrangers retain larger shares of loans on their books 
through the syndication process when the borrowing company requires more intense screening and monitoring). 
To date, the evidence on whether lead arrangers themselves perform a gatekeeping role is mixed, as there is some 
evidence that bank monitoring declines with loan syndication and secondary trading, but that investors are willing 
to buy simply because of the benefits of diversification. Gande & Saunders, supra note 172, at 1675-77. For an 
overview of the literature summarizing the competing views on whether lead arrangers perform a risk-reduction 
function in the syndicated loan markets, see Altunbas et al., supra note 78, at 75-78 (2006).
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be, the current mandated disclosure may simply be excessive or cover the wrong 
information.200 Similarly, while the SEC is sophisticated and relatively well-staffed, the 
regulatory process is undeniably slow.201 To the extent that the optimal type and amount 
of disclosure changes over time, the securities regulations may be slow to respond, at least 
relative to practices in the private markets. By effectively prohibiting innovation in 
disclosure, the regulated markets may be straying ever further from optimal disclosure than 
the unregulated markets.
A final explanation for the leveraged loan phenomenon should be mentioned—and 
dismissed. The natural experiment described in Part A is imperfect because the issuers may 
choose whether to issue loans or bonds, and therefore whether to subject themselves to 
securities regulation.202 This introduces the possibility of selection bias, which departs 
from the drug-trial ideal of randomization. To the extent one observes different outcomes 
in these markets, these may be due to unobserved ex ante differences in their respective 
issuers, for example, rather than purely due to the application vel non of securities 
regulation. Given that issuers view the two forms of debt as substitutes203 and that many 
issuers have both leveraged loans and high-yield bonds in their capital structure at the same 
time,204 there are unlikely to be significant ex ante differences between issuers in the two 
groups. But these cannot be ruled out with theory alone. What we can rule out is the 
possibility that the leveraged loan market is simply the market for “lemons,”205 to which 
low-quality issuers run to escape the securities registration process. The relative credit risks 
of the leveraged loan and high-yield bonds markets belie any such adverse selection effect: 
while leveraged loans and high-yield bonds have similar historic default rates (4% and 
4.3%, respectively), the average creditor recovery following a default is significantly 
higher for leveraged loans (66%) than for high-yield bonds (41%).206
200. In addition to imposing direct, out-of-pocket costs on issuers (and therefore investors), excessive 
disclosure also imposes indirect costs on investors. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text (discussing the 
cost of mandatory disclosure). For example, if  issuers disclose everything under the sun, investors could be more 
inclined to lose the forest for the trees, to become inured to disclosure (c.f., the ubiquitous “Risk Factors”), or 
worse, it might enable issuers to and hide bad information in a sea of innocuous information (the proverbial needle 
in a haystack).
201. See Mulherin, supra note 27, at 424 (discussing the difficulties posed by the lengthy regulatory process 
for empirical tests of regulation).
202. See, e.g., Joshua Rosenbaum & Joshua Pearl, Investment Banking: Valuation, Leveraged 
Buyouts, and Mergers and Acquisitions 178 (2009) (noting that targets of leveraged buyouts may be funded 
by bank loans, high-yield bonds, or some combination of the foregoing, among other types o f debt).
203. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (discussing syndicated loans and bonds as substitutes).
204. See Robert P. Bartlett III, Going Private but Staying Public: Reexamining the Effect o f  Sarbanes-Oxley 
on Firms' Going-private Decisions, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 7, 22-23 (2009) (discussing the issuance of leveraged 
loans and high-yield bonds).
205. George A. Akerlof, The Market fo r  "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 
Q.J. Econ. 488,495 (1970).
206. The Loan Syndications & Trading Ass’n, Through the Cycle: Senior Secured Loans Poised 
TO Perform, supra note 57, at 9. See also Sansone et al., supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing the 
peak of leveraged loans and high-yield bonds).
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2. Why the High-Yield Bond Market?
If this Article’s thesis regarding the ineffectiveness of mandatory disclosure is correct, 
the continued existence of the high-yield bond market demands explanation. Why would 
companies still choose to issue in the public high-yield bond market, given the added 
regulatory transaction costs? Here the possibilities are three-fold.
First, it may be that for some subset of particularly risky or opaque firms, the choice 
of the high-yield market (and thus of mandatory disclosure) may serve as a credible signal 
of quality, without which such firms would not be able to attract investors. If so, then 
mandatory disclosure is doing some work for a small segment of the overall market, and 
this Article’s conclusion about the failings of mandatory disclosure should be scaled back 
accordingly.
The second possibility, for which there is considerably more support, is that many of 
the largest institutional investors in the U.S. financial markets such as pension funds, 
mutual funds, and insurance companies are required to hold all or some minimum portion 
of their assets in the form of registered securities. These requirements may take the form 
of either regulatory fiat207 or internal policies adopted for prudential reasons. Both reflect 
the long-standing (though increasingly contestable) notion that, all else being equal, 
registered securities are safer than unregistered ones. Such investors cannot hold a portfolio 
comprised exclusively of leveraged loans. Thus, to reach such investors, some subset of all 
borrowing companies will issue publicly registered high-yield bonds, rather than loans.
A third possible raison d’etre for the high-yield bond market stems from the fact that, 
notwithstanding our prior assumption, the convergence of the leveraged loan and high- 
yield bond markets is as yet incomplete. While the two instruments can be rendered 
functionally identical in any given instance through drafting, in practice we still find certain 
differences between them on average, though these are rapidly diminishing.208 Most 
significantly, it is still the case that leveraged loans tend to be secured by the borrowing 
company’s assets, which reduces credit risk, while high-yield bonds tend to be 
unsecured.209
This dichotomy points the way to what ought to be the ongoing natural experiment in 
this area. We begin by categorizing leveraged loans and high-yield bonds according to 
whether they are secured by the borrower’s assets. Table 3 below provides the current state 
of each such market segment.
207. See, e.g., Vanguard Group, Inc., Part B Vanguard Fixed Income Securities Funds Statement 
of Additional Information B-26 (2013), available at https://personaI.vanguard.com/pub/Pdf/sai028.pdf 
(describing the SEC regulations limiting mutual funds’ holdings of illiquid and restricted securities, which include 
unregistered securities).
208. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the remaining differences between leveraged loans and high-yield 
bonds).
209. See ROSENBAUM & PEARL, supra note 202, at 184-85 (describing high-yield bonds as “typically 
unsecured”).
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Table 3. High-Yield Fixed Income—Current State
Leveraged Loans High-Yield Bonds
Secured Large volume Small, but increasing volume
Unsecured Small, but increasing volume; 
recent surge in second-lien loans
Large volume
The focus of the experiment should be on two market segments: (1) unsecured 
leveraged loans, and (2) secured bonds. It would strongly signal that mandatory disclosure 
is proving unnecessary for investors in the corporate debt markets if unsecured leveraged 
loans continued to expand and eventually rivaled the size of the unsecured bond market. 
For this reason, regulators should keep an especially close eye on the volume of second- 
lien loans, which are tantalizingly close to unsecured debt.210 If the second-lien market 
continues its rapid expansion, it would suggest a surprising shift in loan investors’ 
expectations—away from negotiated credit protection (covenants, monitoring, and 
collateral)211 and toward alternative sources of risk reduction,212 all in the absence of 
mandatory disclosure. On the other hand, if the secured bond market continues to expand, 
notwithstanding the ready alternative of secured loans, we would have to acknowledge 
that, whether it is effective or not, securities regulation in the fixed-income markets is not 
proving particularly burdensome.
C. Implications
Whether the explanation is that information is now cheaply and reliably produced in 
the debt markets without regulatory intervention, or that mandatory disclosure only makes 
information problems worse, the conclusion that mandatory disclosure case is ineffective 
is a troubling one. There would seem to be a strong case not only for continuing to rely 
solely on private ordering in the loan markets, but also for jettisoning mandatory disclosure 
in the bond markets. Yet, I remain agnostic about whether scaling back the securities 
regulation of bonds is the appropriate response. In fact, there are several plausible 
justifications for maintaining the regulatory status quo, notwithstanding the doctrinal 
inconsistency.
First, maintaining the two markets side-by-side may yield invaluable information as 
to what optimal disclosure actually looks like. To the extent that disclosure in the leveraged 
loan market continues to diverge from that in the high-yield bond market, even while the 
leveraged loan market continues to thrive, mandated disclosure may well be too ossified to 
be useful for investors.213 If disclosure in the two markets begins to converge, however,
210. Standard & Poor’s A Guide to the Loan Market, supra note 62, at 17-18 (describing second- 
lien loans and noting their higher yields and looser covenants as compared to first-lien debt).
211. See Whitehead, supra note 58, at 643—44 (finding that monitoring and covenants may no longer be the 
most cost-efficient means of managing credit risk).
212. See supra Part V.B.l (providing explanations for the leveraged loan phenomenon).
213. Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 14, at 365 (recognizing that it is an open question whether the 
SEC is imposing the optimal level of disclosure).
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we can be more confident that the SEC is adequately anticipating investors’ needs. This 
would provide useful guidance for other markets subject to mandatory disclosure such as 
the public stock markets. Second, certain institutional investors are still confined to holding 
registered securities, such as public bonds.214 Eliminating mandatory disclosure in the 
high-yield bond market would preclude such investors from participating in the market 
going forward.
Note that as we approach true interchangeability of loans and bonds, we also approach 
a regime in which securities regulation is truly elective. Such a regime has heretofore only 
been envisioned, and sometimes advocated, by scholars.215 While private markets of 
tradable non-securities have existed for some time (think of over-the-counter derivatives 
contracts), we have never before had a situation in which a non-securities market was 
essentially identical to a public securities market in pricing, terms, investors, and liquidity. 
Allowing this natural experiment to persist should yield crucial insights not only into the 
debt markets, but also into securities regulation in general.
D. Final Caveats
The conclusion that mandatory disclosure is ineffective in the debt markets, though 
significant, should be appropriately cabined. In particular, it is unclear whether it can be 
extended to the equity markets. Many of the differences between debt and equity, and in 
particular between debt investors and equity investors, bear on the wisdom of mandatory 
disclosure.
First, and most importantly, the private ordering that exists in the debt markets to 
generate information and reduce risk may not be feasible in the equity markets. The pillars 
of mandatory disclosure—the disclosure of financial information and anti-fraud liability— 
are voluntarily adopted in loan agreements. Through routine covenants, borrowers agree to 
produce periodic financial statements throughout the life of the loan, and have them audited 
and distributed to creditors.216 Similarly, borrowers make a standard representation in loan 
agreements that specifically tracks the language of Rule 1 Ob-5.217 Thus, by means of 
contract, loan investors negotiate for similar protections to what the securities laws 
mandate.
Why are such private ordering solutions infeasible for stockholders? The key 
difference is that corporate debt is outstanding for a limited and predetermined period of 
time, most often less than ten years. The relevant parties can agree relatively easily on what 
would be useful for investors to know and what would be feasible for the company to 
provide while the loan is outstanding. Equity, on the other hand, is of potentially infinite
214. See supra note 207 and accompanying text (discussing the SEC’s regulations limiting mutual funds’ 
holdings).
215. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 29, at 2361-62 (advocating a reconceptualization of securities regulation 
to a market approach, “by modifying the federal law in favor or a menu approach to securities regulation under 
which firms elect whether to be covered by federal laws or by the securities law of a specified state”); Stephen J. 
Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach o f Securities Regulation, 
71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 903, 904-06 (1998) (recommending a “regulatory regime that focuses on regulatory 
competition and gives issuers and investors the ability to choose the law that governs their transactions”).
216. WIGHT ET al., supra note 130.
217. Id. at 273.
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duration. The transaction costs would be too high for the company and its stockholders to 
agree ex ante on what the company would provide as disclosure forever, and amendments 
would be too costly.218
A second difference may be linked to the stage in the corporate lifecycle at which 
mandatory disclosure comes into play. Equity funding of some kind is clearly required 
from the outset, while debt financing is usually only available when the firm has reached a 
certain level of maturity and stability in its cash flows. The fact that debt is most typically 
issued by mature companies lessens both the riskiness of the investment and the difficulty 
of specifying appropriate disclosure.219
Third, although their participation is declining as a percentage of the whole, direct 
retail investors still hold a meaningful share of the public equity markets.220 As discussed, 
the protection of investors that have little ability to bear losses is a fundamentally different, 
and sometimes conflicting, goal from correcting the market’s informational 
inefficiencies.221 The foregoing analysis of mandatory disclosure only holds to the extent 
that we put aside the goal of protecting unsophisticated investors, which we can 
comfortably do in the corporate debt markets.222
E. The 144A Red Herring
As a result of the 1990 promulgation of Rule 144A, the regulatory divide between 
loans and bonds is in fact more nuanced than it has been depicted here thus far.223 Rule
218. See generally Oliver Hart, Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure (1995) (using the theory 
of incomplete contracts to justify firms’ capital structure); Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Incomplete 
Contracts and the Theory o f  Contract Design, 56 Case W. Res. L. Rev . 187 (2005). This is partly why corporate 
charters and by-laws are so spare in their provisions—they are intended to govern indefinitely. Another way of 
saying this: we can say with something like a straight face that debt issuances involve a negotiated contractual 
relationship between issuers and investors, whereas the notion becomes more dubious for equity, the terms of 
which generally amount to a take-it-or-leave-it proposition.
219. Cf. Andrew A. Schwartz, The Perpetual Corporation, 80 Geo . WASH. L. REV. 764, 787 (2012). With 
equity investments, the nightmare (and not implausible) scenario for regulators is that shareholders will lose their 
entire investment. With debt, that concern is significantly lessened—debt instruments (at least, straight debt 
instruments) are simply less risky on average, because they are higher in priority in the capital structure than 
equity.
220. As but one example, the SEC’s exemption for private placements under Rule 506 and congressional 
preemption of state regulation have arguably opened the door to significant abuses in small placements, involving 
the marketing of highly risky and sometimes fraudulent securities to unwary individuals with little ability to bear 
losses. See Jennifer J. Johnson, Private Placements: A Regulatory Black Hole, 35 Del. J. Corp. L. 151, 188 
(2010) (stating that exemption makes retail investors vulnerable).
221. For this reason, if  we opted to scale back securities regulation of the bond markets, the void may need 
to be filled by restrictions on individuals’ direct participation in the market. In other words, this might push us 
into a system of regulating investors rather than issuers. See Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A 
Market-Based Proposal, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 280, 283 (2000) (advocating for a regime in which the nature of the 
investor determines securities regulation).
222. If this Article’s conclusion does not necessarily extend to equity, the same is true as to other, more 
exotic types of debt and more complex financial instruments such as derivatives, which have less well-established 
markets and market participants, and raise a host o f different concerns, including a greater likelihood o f systemic 
effects if  the market sours. With derivatives in particular, losses can be amplified far beyond the “mere” loss of 
one’s investment, making systemic effects more likely than for traditional corporate debt.
223. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2013).
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144A exempts from securities registration any resales of securities made exclusively to 
qualified institutional buyers (QIBs), that is, to financial institutions that own and manage 
more than $100 million in investments.224 Sales of corporate bonds under Rule 144 A have 
been wildly popular, including in particular in the high-yield space. A typical high-yield 
bond offering of this type begins with the sale of the bonds from the issuer to the 
underwriters (referred to in this context as “initial purchasers”).225 Rule 144A then 
exempts from registration under the ‘33 Act the resale of the notes from the underwriters 
to the ultimate investors, and all subsequent trading among investors, so long as they are 
QIBs. Thus, unregistered Rule 144A notes occupy a place on the spectrum between 
traditional, private bank loans and public, registered bonds. Furthermore, like syndicated 
loans, they blur the distinction between private and public debt.
Because Rule 144A high-yield offerings are not subject to mandatory disclosure under 
the securities laws, at first blush they appear to be an obvious starting point for testing the 
effects of mandatory disclosure in the debt markets: the natural experiment would simply 
involve comparing registered (public) high-yield bonds to unregistered (Rule 144A) high- 
yield bonds, rather than to leveraged loans. And in fact, the disclosure provided in offering 
memoranda for Rule 144A offerings is virtually identical to that in registration statements 
for public bonds, notwithstanding the absence of disclosure requirements.226 Does this 
imply that mandated disclosure in the public market is in fact the optimal level of 
disclosure?227 If private offerings voluntarily mimic disclosure in the public markets, 
shouldn’t that suggest that the public markets require the “right” level of disclosure?
Unfortunately, the disclosure practices in the Rule 144A market are a false lead. 
Voluntary disclosure under Rule 144A mimics disclosure for registered offerings because 
Rule 144A merely serves as a waiting room228 for public registration. Bonds that are 
initially sold under Rule 144A are most often subsequently exchanged into registered 
public bonds.229 The offering memorandum for a Rule 144A offering anticipates that event 
and its disclosure is prepared accordingly.230 Why the two-step registration process? Rule 
144A allows issuers to close deals quickly and avoid the delay associated with registered
224. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(a)(l)(i) (2013).
225. Mark B. Tresnowski & Gerald T. Nowak, The H igh Yield Offering: An  Issuer’s Perspective 
49 (2004), available at http://www.kirkland.com/files/Nowak_HighYieldOfferingsBook.PDF. The sale of 
securities to the underwriters is exempt from registration as a private placement under Section 4(2) of the ’33 Act. 
Id.
226. Id. at 25 (describing the offering memorandum for a Rule 144A offering as looking “very much like 
the prospectus for a registered public offering”).
227. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 204, at 20 (2009) (describing the Sarbanes-Oxley’s effect on firms’ going- 
private decisions).
228. Credit is due to Don Langevoort for suggesting this analogy.
229. See William J. Whelan III, The Statutory Arrangement fo r  Public and Private Securities Offerings 
under the Securities Act o f  1933, in Securities Offerings 2007: Operating Under the New Rules 49,59 
(Practicing Law Institute 2007) (discussing how “many offerings under Rule 144A are convertible debt” where 
“the issuer typically agrees to file a so-called resale shelf-registration statement in order to provide investors with 
freely tradable securities”); TRESNOWSKI & Nowak, supra note 225, at 25 (describing the offering 
memorandum’s resemblance to a registration statement for a public offering); ROSENBAUM & Pearl, supra note 
202, at 185 (stating that, typically, high-yield bonds are initially sold to QIBs under Rule 144A, and then registered 
with the SEC within one year).
230. Tresnowski & Nowak, supra note 225, at 51.
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offerings,231 while the eventual registration eliminates the Rule 144A resale restrictions 
and brings in investors who are restricted to holding registered securities.232 Thus, while 
the dramatic growth of the 144A market is fascinating in its own right, its disclosure 
practices unfortunately do not help us understand whether the disclosure mandated for 
public bond offerings is optimal.
VI. C o n c l u sio n
The answer to whether mandatory disclosure, the lynchpin of federal securities 
regulation, is effective has long remained elusive. Thanks to a novel natural experiment, 
however, we may finally have that answer for the largest source of corporate financing, the 
corporate debt markets. If leveraged loans, which continue to be treated as non-securities, 
can surpass high-yield bonds in depth and liquidity, mandatory disclosure is not the optimal 
mechanism for investment information that it purports to be. Solely through private 
ordering, the loan market is now generating sufficient information to entice more robust 
investment and trading than its regulated counterpart. What this means for securities 
regulation is less clear. Though the continued regulatory discrepancy between loans and 
bonds has become untenable as a doctrinal matter, the absence of pressure to correct from 
either market participants or regulators suggests that, contrary to all expectations, little may 
turn on the balance.
231. Id. at 5.
232. See Standard & Poor’s, High Yield Bond Primer, supra note 112 (noting that only a small (albeit 
growing) percentage of 144A high-yield bond issuances are “144A-for-life,” that is, not subject to registration 
rights).
Copyright of Journal of Corporation Law is the property of University of Iowa, College of
Law (Journal of Corporation Law) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple
sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission.
However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.
